Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

4-2017

Sector Agnosticism and the Coming
Transformation of Education Law
Nicole Stelle Garnett
Notre Dame Law School, ngarnett@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Education Economics Commons, and the Education Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nicole S. Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming Transformation of Education Law, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1278

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 70

JANUARY 2017

NUMBER 1

ARTICLES
Sector Agnosticism and the Coming
Transformation of Education Law
Nicole Stelle Garnett*
Over the past two decades, the landscape of elementary and secondary
education in the United States has shifted dramatically, due to the emergence
and expansion of privately provided, but publicly funded, schooling options
(including both charter schools and private school choice devices like vouchers,
tax credits, and educational savings accounts). This transformation in the
delivery of K12 education is the result of a confluence of factors-discussed in
detail below-that increasingly lead education reformers to support efforts to
increase the number of high quality schools serving disadvantaged students
across all three educational sectors, instead of focusing exclusively on reforming
urban public schools. As a result, millions of American children now attend
privately operated, publicly funded schools. This rise in a ''sector agnostic"
education policy has profound implications for the state and federal
constitutional law of education because it blurs the distinction between charter
and private schools. This Article explores three of the most significant of these
implications.
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INTRODUCTION

In May 2014, the Louisiana Recovery School District closed the
last of its traditional public schools in New Orleans and announced that
it would, henceforth, no longer operate any schools in the city, but
instead will authorize and regulate privately operated charter schools. 1
1.
The district, a statewide entity, operates a handful of schools outside of New Orleans and
Orleans Parish School District, but has a stated policy of doing so only until a high-performing
charter operator can be recruited to assume control of them. Direct-Run Schools, RECOVERY SCH.
DISTRICT, http://www.rsdla.net/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=195276&type=d&termREC_ID=
&pREC_ID=396825 (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/J2MR-6VLY]. The Orleans
Parish School Board, which operated the public school system in New Orleans before Katrina,
currently runs six traditional public schools in the city; it also serves as an authorizer of charter
schools. Our Schools, ORLEANS PARISH SCH. BOARD, http://opsb.us/about/our-schools/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3RS5-38U4). Prior to the hurricane, the Orleans Parish School
Board operated over 125 traditional public schools in the city, and the district was widely regarded
as one of the worst performing school districts in the United States. Transforming Public
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Parents living in New Orleans today have the option of sending their
children to a charter school or one of the five traditional public schools
operated by the Orleans Parish School Board. Families under a certain
income threshold also can receive a publicly funded scholarship to
attend a private school. 2 The New Orleans situation is, in many
respects, sui generis, since the Recovery School District resolved to
operate an "all charter" district in the city in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina. 3 In other respects, the Recovery School District's decision is
emblematic of a much broader trend in education reform. A major shift
is occurring in K12 education in the United States, especially in urban
centers. Frustrated with the pace and prospect of efforts to improve
urban public schools, reformers are increasingly focusing on growing
the supply of high quality educational options outside the traditional
public school sector. 4 As a result, millions of American children now
attend privately operated, but publicly funded, schools: approximately
three million attend privately operated charter schools, and at least
four hundred thousand attend a private school with funds provided by
a publicly funded school choice program. 5
Education in New Orleans: The Recovery School District 2003-2011, COWEN INST. 3-7 (2011),
http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/History-o f-the-RSD-Report- 2011. pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XUY-ZSNY]. In May, the state enacted legislation transferring supervision of
the charter schools in the Recovery School District to the Orleans Parish School Board by 2019.
See Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans' Katrina School Takeover to End, Legislature Decides, TIMES·
PICAYUNE (May 5, 2016, 5:19 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2016/05/new_orleans
_schools_reunify.html [https://perma.cc/2PNA-QCWB].
Danielle Dreilinger, Louisiana School Voucher Enrollment Opens for Fall 2014, TIMES2.
PICAYUNE (Jan. 15, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/0l/louisiana
_school_voucher_enrol.html [https://perma.cc/4U24-YDNP]; Lyndsey Layton, In New Orleans,
Major School District Closes Traditional Public Schools for Good, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-new-orleans-tradit ional-public-schools-closefor-good/2014/05/28/ae4f5 724-e5de- l le3-8f90- 73e07 lf3d63 7_story .html [https://perma.cc/U 58FVL8A]. Louisiana operates a statewide parental choice program, known as the Louisiana
Scholarship Program, which provides low-income families with resources to attend participating
private schools. Information about that program is available at Louisiana Scholarship Program,
DEP'T EDUC., http://www.louisianabelieves.com/schools/louisiana-scholarship-progr am (last
visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/T7YH-M9J7]. Information about the New Orleans
Recovery School District's charter-enrollment options is available at New Orleans Public School
Enrollment, RECOVERY SCH. DISTRICT, enrollnola.org [https://perma.cc/5YEH-CUXV].
See, e.g., Transforming Public Education in New Orleans, supra note 1, at 1-2 (discussing
3.
the impact of the Recovery School District on education in New Orleans).
James A. Peyser, Boston and the Charter School Cap, EDUC. NEXT 14, 15 (2014),
4.
http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_XIV_l_peyser.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F3B-A 7RD] (noting
that over the past several years the Gates Foundation has brokered fifteen "district-charter
collaboration compacts" between urban school districts and charter schools, each of which commits
the district to making charter schools an integral part of a broader school-reform strategy).
Estimated Number of Public Charter Schools & Students, 2014-2015, NAT'L ALLIANCE
5.
http://www.publiccharters.org/wp2015),
(Feb.
1
SCHS.
CHARTER
PUB.
FOR
content/uploads/2015/02/open_closed_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAR9-3HKH]; School Choice
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In the education policy world, "portfolio" has become a popular
buzzword. Education "portfolio" models theoretically shift the role of
public education officials from public school operators to the regulators
of schools across multiple educational sectors. 6 Portfolio strategies
combine continued efforts to improve urban public schools with efforts
to increase the supply of high quality schools accessible to low-income
students in the charter sector, and, in states with publicly funded
private school choice, the private sector as well. As a practical matter,
however, even the most vigorous proponents of "portfolio" reforms face
serious institutional impediments to implementing them. The reality is
that the diffusion of authority over K12 education usually means there
is no (and there is often no realistic possibility of) a portfolio manager.
Except where a state has assumed control of a local school district and
vested operational authority in the hands of a mayor (as in New York
City, Newark, and Chicago) or a state-controlled entity (as in
Philadelphia and New Orleans), local elected officials lack the legal
authority to implement education reforms directly, but rather must
assume the roles of cheerleader and talent recruiter. 7 Even where the
local school district has been divested of operational authority, state
education law generally distributes control over core components of the
"portfolio" across a variety of actors. 8 State laws frequently determine
the extent of parental choice (if any) by establishing the baseline
conditions under which charter schools are permitted to operate and
determining whether (and to what extent) private schools are included
in the menu of publicly funded parental choice options. The
accountability rules for public, private, and charter schools also are
generally a matter of state and federal law, and are sometimes
supplemented by even more rigorous expectations of private
philanthropists. 9 Federal education policy further complicates the
in America, EDCHOICE, http://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america/ (last
visited Sept. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y92S-JX4N].
6.
See, e.g., BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW
PORTFOLIO MODELS FOR URBAN SCHOOL REFORM (Katrina E. Bulkley et al. eds., 2010); PAUL T.
HILL ET AL., STRIFE AND PROGRESS: PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING URBAN SCHOOLS 31
(2012) (explaining details of the portfolio strategy).
7.
See generally KENNETH K. WONG ET AL., THE EDUCATION MAYOR: IMPROVING AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (2007) (discussing mayoral control in urban education); Kenneth K. Wong & Francis X.
Shen, Mayoral Governance and Student Achievement, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 22, 2013),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2013/03/22/56934/mayoralgovernance-and-student-achievement/ [https://perma.cc/8Z97-8AP3] (discussing the benefits of
mayoral governance of education).
8.
See, e.g., Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84
N.C. L. REV. 857, 912 (2006) (arguing that states can maintain power through mayoral control).
9.
See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Schooled: Cory Booker, Chris Christie, and Mark Zuckerberg
Had a Plan to Reform Newark's Schools. They Got an Education, NEW YORKER (May 19, 2014),
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picture by effectively forcing states to implement favored policies (such
as the elimination of caps on charter schools and value-added teacher
eval ua ti on practices). lO
A more accurate description of the rapidly evolving landscape of
urban K12 education-and the one employed throughout this Articleis what Andy Smarick dubbed "sector agnosticism." 11 That is to say,
education reformers and urban leaders alike are coming to embrace a
child-focused, rather than a sector-focused, reform agenda. This agenda
has as its central goal maximizing the number of high quality
educational options for disadvantaged children now across all three
education sectors (charter, private, and traditional public), in addition
to pursuing longer-term solutions to seemingly intractable academic
struggles of urban public schools. While this agenda remains deeply
contested, it is driving both the demand-side and supply-side of
education reform. 12 Sector agnosticism seeks to pair increased
educational options for parents with increased supply of highperforming schools, especially schools serving disadvantaged urban
students. The extent of these reforms varies dramatically from city to
city: in some cities, urban leaders not only actively recruit charter
school operators to open new schools, but also enlist them to "convert"
and manage failing public schools as charter schools. These chartercentric efforts are combined in some states with private school choice
programs, although thus far the effects of these programs have been (at
least outside of Milwaukee) quite modest. 13 In other cities, urban
[https://perma.cc/U9SK-CX9W]
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/schooled
(discussing an effort to reform education in poor communities).
10. See infra notes 120-133 and accompanying text.
11. ANDY SMARICK, THE URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEM OF THE FUTURE (2012); see also Michael Q.
McShane, Moving from a School System to a System of Schools, EDUC. NEXT (Nov. 9, 2012),
[https://perma.cc
http://educationnext.org/moving-from-a-school-system-to-a-system-of- schools/
NLD4-WA8M] (reviewing Smarick's book and the idea of sector agnosticism).
12. Diane Ravitch, Are Charter Schools Public Schools?, EDUC. WK. (May. 9, 2012, 9:09 AM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/Bridging-Differences/2012/05/are_cha rter_schools_public_sch
.html [https://perma.cc/JNE2-SQEQ]; Richard Whitmire, Charter School War Could Go National,
USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2014, 3:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/01/bill-deblasio-cuomo-charter-schools-new-york-column/7158071/ [https://perma.cc/27K6-Z25G).
13. In 2013-2014, over 2.5 million students attended a charter school, and just over three
hundred thousand students participated in private school choice programs. In Milwaukee, the
balance is quite different: more students are currently enrolled in the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program (approximately twenty-five thousand) than in charter schools (eighteen thousand) in the
city. A Growing Movement: America's Largest Charter School Communities, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR
http://www.publiccharters.org/wp2014),
(Dec.
7
SCHS.
CHARTER
PUB.
content/uploads/2014/12/2014 _Enrollment_Share_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV5K-CMSF];
Hope, Action, Results: Yearbook 2013-14, ALLIANCE FOR SCH. CHOICE 15 (2014),
/uploads/2014/01/AFC_2013http://allianceforschoolchoice.org/wp-content
14_Yearbook.pdf?82497a [https://perma.cc/N5RB-PBCQ). This school year, over seventy-six
thousand students are enrolled in Milwaukee Public Schools. District Fact Sheet, MILWAUKEE PUB.
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education officials use the language of "portfolio" but eschew many of
its core components, including an expansion of educational options and
accountability for academic performance.1 4
The emergence of this "child-centered" (rather than sectorcentered) approach to education reform is the result of a number of
factors. The first is the rise and dramatic expansion of parental choice,
especially the exponential growth of charter schools and, more recently,
an expansion in the number of programs enabling parents to send their
children to private schools with public funds. The second is the failure
of, and massive resistance to, accountability policies imposed by the
deeply unpopular No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB"), many of which
Congress eliminated in December 2015 in the new federal education
legislation, called the Every Student Succeeds Act ("ESSA"). 15
Somewhat ironically, the public sector's resistance-and inability-to
comply with these standards arguably fueled the transition to a sectoragnostic, child-centered education policy. NCLB's testing and reporting
requirements laid bare the persistent academic struggles of traditional
public schools, especially those serving disadvantaged children. These
struggles have not only stimulated efforts to increase the supply ofhighperforming charter schools but have also led state and local education
leaders to favor enlisting charter operators to assume control of failing
public schools rather than seeking to reform them from within the
traditional public sector. 16 Moreover, prior to the enactment of the
ESSA, the Obama administration granted forty-three state regulatory
waivers from complying with the most onerous of NCLB's
accountability requirements, each of which was conditioned upon an

SCHS.,
http://mps.milwaukee.kl2.wi.us/en/District/About-MPS/District-Fact-Sheet.htm
(last
visited Dec. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/QQX4-7GN5].
14. See Porfolio Implementation Snapshot, CTR. FOR REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., http://www
.crpe.org/research/portfolio/tools/snapshot (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3XAL4MKW] (comparing several districts' progress across several categories in implementing the
portfolio model).
15. Alyson Klein, ESEA Reauthorization: The Every Student Succeeds Act Explained, EDUC.
WK. (Dec. 10, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign·k·l2/2015/ll/esea
_reauthorization_the_every.html [https://perma.ccN2FV-C8CC].
16. See Andy Smarick, The Turnaround Fallacy: Stop Trying to Fix Failing Schools. Close
Them and Start Fresh, EDUC. NEXT 20-26 (2010), http://educationnext.org/the-turnaround-fallacy/
[https://perma.cc/2XP3-Y3D5] (arguing that turnarounds have failed and that schools should
instead follow the charter model).
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agreement to implement certain policies, 17 including an expansion of
charter schools. 18
The shift toward a sector-agnostic education policy has profound
implications for education law. This Article discusses three of the most
significant, all of which flow from the blurring of the public-private
distinction between charter and private schools. The accepted view
(which is universally reflected in charter school statutes) is that charter
schools are privately operated public schools, rather than publicly
funded private ones. As originally conceived, charter school laws
authorize the creation of new public schools through an agreement ("the
charter") between a government-authorized chartering authority and a
private individual or organization. These schools would be freed of the
obligation to comply with many government regulations and would add
diversity to the public educational landscape. The charter school
market, however, has evolved away from this model. Many
developments, including the emergence of a relatively "hands-off'
laissez faire charter school regulatory regime, arguably have led to a
convergence between charter schools and private schools, especially
private schools participating in parental choice programs. A case can be
made (and is being made with some success in both state and federal
courts) that charter schools are, in many legally significant respects,
publicly funded private schools-not privately operated public ones. 19
The conclusion that charter schools are private entities has at
least three important legal implications for the constitutional law of
education. The first is the possibility of religious charter schools.
Conventional wisdom holds that, while private religious schools can
participate in voucher or tax-credit programs without running afoul of
the Federal Establishment Clause, charter schools must be secular
schools. There are two reasons why: First, charter schools are presumed
to be public schools (and universally designated as such by state charter
laws), and the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that public schools
must be secular. Second, in its Establishment Clause decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court has distinguished between educational programs that
provide financial assistance directly to schools (which must be secular)
and those that provide assistance to parents and students but that
17. Alyson Klein & Andrew Ujifusa, States Gaining a Say on School Accountability, EDUC.
WK. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/08/19/states-gaining-a-say-on school-accountability.html [https://perma.cc/SW 48-LLMJ].
18. See Brian Montopoli, Obama's Remarks on Education, CBS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2009, 10:14
[https://perma.cc/4K6Rhttp://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-remarks-on-education/
AM),
PRH8] ("Provided this greater accountability, I call on states to reform their charter rules, and lift
caps on the number of allowable charter schools, wherever such caps are in place.").
19. See infra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
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indirectly benefit schools (which can be religious). It is widely assumed
that charter school programs fall on the "direct assistance" side of that
equation, but vouchers and tax credits are "indirect" aid programs. As
a result of the evolution in K12 education policy described in this
Article, however, the distinctions between charter schools and private
schools have eroded to the point where religious charter schools ought
to be constitutionally permissible, at least in many states. 20
The implications for both state and federal constitutional law of
characterizing charter schools as private rather than public, however,
extend beyond the Establishment Clause. In the federal ·context, the
U.S. Constitution only binds governmental actors (including public
schools). Therefore, if charter schools are private schools-that is, as
several federal courts have held, if they are not "state actors"-then
they are not bound by the constitutional norms that govern the
relationship between public schools and their students and teachers. 21
Finally, in the state context, many state constitutions contain
provisions that explicitly or impliedly limit the government's ability to
enlist private schools to assist in the task of public education.
Presumably, if charter schools are private schools, then they ought to
be bound by these state constitutional restrictions as well. In other
words, as charter school opponents have begun to argue, the public
funding of charter schools ought to be legally impermissible to the same
extent (if any) as the public funding of private schools. 22 This once
seemingly far-fetched argument carried the day in September 2015,
when the Washington Supreme Court became the first state supreme
court to hold that charter schools were insufficiently "public" to receive
public funds. In League of Women Voters v. State of Washington, the
court held that the Washington Constitution reserved public education
funds to "common schools," and charter schools did not satisfy the
definition of common schools. 2 3
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part One outlines the factors
that have led to the emergence of sector-agnostic education policies,
including the rise of parental choice, the emergence and failure of public
school accountability policies, and the more recent convergence of these
trends. Part Two discusses three legal implications of sector
20. See infra notes 163-196 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 205--212, 224-228 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 245-255 and accompanying text.
23. League of Women Voters v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 401-05 (Wash. 2015). Previously, the
Georgia Supreme Court had invalidated the establishment of a state charter school commission,
reasoning that the state constitution required closer local supervision of all public schools, but the
state constitution was subsequently amended to permit charter schools. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist.
v. Cox, 710 S.E.2d 773, 775 (Ga. 2011).
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agnosticism. The first implication is that the federal Establishment
Clause may not preclude faith-based charter schools; the second is that
charter schools may be, for purposes of federal constitutional law,
private rather than public actors; and the third is that charter schools
may be subject to state constitutional provisions that restrict the
funding of private schools. The Article concludes by briefly reflecting on
the factors that may determine-and the significant institutional and
public choice impediments to-further transition to sector agnosticism.

I. THE PATH TO SECTOR AGNOSTICISM
The shift toward a sector-agnostic education policy results from
the confluence of two very different policy responses to the persistent
academic struggles of urban public schools. While these responsesparental choice and accountability-proceeded on separate tracks for
decades, they have converged in recent years. This Section briefly
outlines the emergence of sector-agnostic, child-focused education
policies, including the emergence and expansion of parental choice in
education, the imposition of accountability requirements for public
school performance, and the shift in many cities from school "turn
around" efforts to "turn over" strategies characterized by the conversion
of failing public schools into charter schools. The feedback effects
between each of these developments, combined with a sense of urgency
about the need to narrow the achievement gap, have led-perhaps
inevitably but certainly unpredictably-to a focus on increasing the
number of high quality educational options for low-income kids outside
of traditional public schools. 24 In other words, these factors lead toward
sector-agnostic education policy.
A. The Parental Choice Revolution

All efforts to increase the number of high quality options
available to parents is dependent, to some extent, upon parental choice

24. See generally NEW AND BE'ITER SCHOOLS: THE SUPPLY SIDE OF SCHOOL CHOICE (Michael
McShane ed., 2014) (describing supply-side problems in private school choice); Christine Campbell,
Growing Great Schools in Every Neighborhood: The Promise of the Portfolio Strategy, CATALYST
http://www.brac.org/docs/catalyst/Catalyst_Jan-Mar2014_Schools.pdf
(Jan.-Mar. 2014),
[https://perma.cc/QHF2-9TEJ] (discussing the decrease of low performance schools and increase of
"high-quality seats"); James H. Lytle, An Enrollment Policy Built on Shaky Ground, NOTEBOOK
(Feb. 3, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://thenotebook.org/blog/146843/high-quality-seats-school-choicestrategy-built-on-shaky-ground [https://perma.cc/X9AH-C3RX] (criticizing the Philadelphia
School Reform Commission" 'high quality seats' strategy"); NEWSCHOOLS VENTURE FUND (2016),
http://www.newschools.org [https://perma.cc/F75H-G4H3] (describing venture philanthropy
efforts to foster creation of new high quality charter schools).
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in education. Sector-agnostic education policy necessarily requires that
those options be spread across multiple education sectors. Today, most
states offer parents an array-and in some jurisdictions a dizzying
array--of educational options: many districts offer "magnet schools"
and/or "public school choice"; 25 forty-three states and the District of
Columbia authorize charter schools; 26 and more than half of all states
and the District of Columbia have publicly funded private school choice
programs. This smorgasbord approach to delivery of public education
represents a dramatic-indeed seismic-shift away from the historical
status quo in the United States. The idea of publicly funded school
choice is a deeply contested one in American history, dating at least to
the mid-nineteenth century battles over the public funding of Catholic
schools. 27 Education policies that funded parents' decisions to select any
school other than the public school assigned to them by either
geography or-in the post-desegregation world-federal court order28
were rare until recent decades, although parents with the financial
means to do so have long chosen their children's schools, either by
moving to districts with high-performing schools or by financing private
education. 29
1. The Public School Roots of Parental Choice

The road to sector agnosticism arguably began in an unexpected
place and time-suburban Detroit, Michigan. In 1971, a federal district
court ruled that the Detroit Public Schools had unconstitutionally
discriminated against African American students in various ways,
including the drawing of attendance zones, assignment of teachers, and
25. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2045, 2063-73 (2002) (describing the different varieties of school choice plans).
26. Alabama Enacts a Public Charter School Law; Joins 42 States and D. C., NAT'L ALLIANCE
FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/press/al-legislaturepasses-bill/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9U-CMG9].
27. See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG & NICOLE S. GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, LOST
COMMUNITY 16-18 (2014) (discussing "the funding question" in Catholic schools); PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 221-29 (2002) (documenting the conflict between
those desiring an alliance between church and state and those desiring separation); JOHN T.
MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 111-21 (2003) (discussing the controversy
surrounding the state's power over education).
28. In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and especially Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), federal courts routinely ordered
"busing" as a remedy for past discriminatory student assignment.
29. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 201, 212-14 (2010) (reviewing data on private school enrollment and moving to opt
into public school systems). In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Supreme Court
held that parents had a constitutional right to send their children to private school, invalidating
an Oregon law that mandated public school attendance.
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allocation of public resources. The district court further ruled that the
State of Michigan had violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing
to adequately supervise the Detroit public school system to prevent this
discrimination. 30 A year later, the district court granted a sweeping
multi-district busing remedy, which required the compulsory transfer
of students between the Detroit public schools and fifty-three
surrounding suburban districts. 31 A divided Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that "any less comprehensive a
solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all black
school system immediately surrounded by practically all white
suburban school systems." 32 In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the district court had exceeded its equitable
powers by imposing the multi-district remedy because there was no
evidence that the suburban school districts included in the remedy had
engaged in intentional race discrimination. "Boundary lines may be
bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief," Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority, "but the
notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a
mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public
education in our country."33
By effectively limiting the scope qf desegregation remedies to
urban school districts, many of which were, or were fast becoming,
majority-minority, Milliken dealt a tremendous blow to integration
proponents. 34 But, the decision also prompted districts to experiment
with strategies that sought to achieve integration by other means,
including magnet schools and public school choice programs that
allowed students to choose to attend a traditional public school other
than one geographically assigned to them. In the 1977 Milliken II
decision, 35 the Supreme Court approved these "compensatory"
strategies, and, since then, magnet schools and public school choice has
30. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587-90 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
31. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
32. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973).
33. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974).
34. See, e.g., KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA
210-12 (2005) (explaining that limiting the Milliken decision to urban school districts dramatically
limited desegregation and contributed to "white flight" to suburban school districts); CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 45 (2004)
(arguing that after Milliken, "racial disparities between districts tended to widen"); GARY ORFIELD
& SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 143 (1996) (discussing the difficulty of how to integrate schools and courts' attempts
to find a solution in Milliken); JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 91-108 (2010)
(discussing the Milliken case and its consequences).
35. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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proliferated. While attendance at a traditional, geographically assigned
public school remains the norm in many communities, 36 the number of
students attending a chosen public school continues to rise steadily. In
2007, over fifteen percent of all public school students reported
attending a school other than the one geographically assigned to them,
and forty-six percent of parents reported that public school choice was
an option for them. 37 The availability of public school choice options is
even higher in urban districts, many of which offer (in theory) universal
public school choice. 38 A number of states also permit inter-district
school choice, although the extent of choices available for low-income
urban students is often dramatically constrained by available space and
the public-choice reality that more affluent, higher-performing public
schools are often not particularly welcoming of transfers. 39
Magnet schools arguably represented the first portfolio
management effort in public education policy. As themed (and
sometimes semi-autonomous) public school choice options, magnet
schools also arguably paved the way for later experimentation with
charter schools-the creation and exponential growth of which has been
the primary factor fueling the movement toward sector-agnostic
education policy. 40 Magnet schools remain important component parts
of the menu of options av:ailable to parents in many cities. The
enrollment in magnet schools in 2013-2014, the last year for which data
is available from the U.S. Department of Education, was approximately

36. In 2007, the parents of twenty-seven percent of public school children reported that they
moved to their current neighborhood so that their child could attend his or her school. Fast Facts:
Public School Choice Programs, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display
.asp?id=6 (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y27M-CGRK]. This kind of residential
sorting increases as parents' educational attainment rises. Jack Buckley & Mark Schneider,
School Choice, Parental Information, and Tiebout Sorting: Evidence from Washington, DC, in THE
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATS 101, 104
(William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
37. Fast Facts: Public School Choice Programs, supra note 36.
38. In practice, non-magnet schools frequently are permitted to favor residents of their
geographic attendance zones, leaving limited space in high-performing schools for nonresident
students. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 25, at 2064-65 (explaining that magnet schools fault to
assigning students to neighborhood schools). Most seats in magnet schools are allotted by lottery,
test scores, or both. See Magnet Schools: By the Numbers, SMART CHOICE TECHS.,
https://smartchoicetech.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MSA_Infographic.pdf (last visited Sept.
14, 2016) (https://perma.cc/PZ5K-ENU6] (showing that preference lottery or blind lottery accounts
for seventy-four percent of student selection, and academic criteria accounts for seventeen percent
of student selection).
39. Ryan & Heise, supra note 25, at 2066-73.
40. See CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION: RENEWING PUBLIC
EDUCATION 17 (2000) ("[C]harter schools have cousins in the in the K-12 family. Their DNA looks
much the same under the education microscope as that of lab schools, magnet schools, sitemanaged schools, and special focus schools .... ").
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the same as the number of students enrolled in charter schools (around
2.5 million), although there were nearly twice as many charter schools
(6,079) as magnet schools (3,151). 41 Given the exponential growth in
charter school market share in many jurisdictions, however, magnet
school enrollment is being eclipsed by charter school enrollment.
2. The Surprising Revolution: Charter Schools
If Milliken II opened the door for parental choice, the enactment
of the nation's first charter school law by Minnesota in 1991 opened the
floodgates. 42 The implications of Minnesota's reform were not
immediately apparent. At their inception, charter schools were
perceived as a relatively modest reform that offered a more moderate
alternative to private school voucher programs. As they have evolved,
however, charter schools have become conceptually and operationally
quite distinct from their traditional public school progenitors.
Importantly, unlike magnet schools, they are not operated by the
government. Charter schools are privately operated schools that are
technically "created" by an agreement-"the charter"-between a
charter operator (usually a nonprofit, but, in some cases, a for-profit
entity) and a charter authorizer (which, depending upon the state, can
include a range of governmental, educational, and nonprofit private
entities). Charter schools resemble public schools in that they are
tuition free, secular, and are open to all who wish to attend-generally,
oversubscribed charter schools must admit applicants by lottery,
although some are permitted to prefer neighborhood students and/or to
test applicants for admission. 43 Charter schools also have many
attributes of private schools. Importantly, they are privately operatedincreasingly by "charter management organizations," which operate
multiple schools within and across jurisdictions. 44 They also have wide41. Digest of Education Statistics, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. tbl.216.20 (Jan. 2015),
[https://perma.cc/T3VT-JEFL]
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_216.20.asp
(noting number and enrollment of public elementary and secondary schools).
42. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Charter School Idea Turns 20, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 25,
2008), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/03/26/29kahlenberg_ep.h2 7 .html [https://perma.cc
/6Y88-LS3G] (discussing the origin of the idea for charter schools and the first charter school
legislation).
43. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Disparate Impact, School Closures, and Parental Choice, 2014 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 338; Valerie Strauss, How Charter Schools Choose Desirable Students, WASH.
POST (Feb. 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/02/16/h owcharter-schools-choose-desirable-students/ [https ://perma.cc/PEP9-9ZFK].
44. Technically, "charter management organizations" are nonprofit entities that manage two
or more charter schools, and "educational management organizations" are for-profit entities that
do the same. Some states prohibit for-profit entities from operating charter schools. See CMO and
EMO Public Charter Schools: A Growing Phenomenon in the Charter School Sector, NAT'L
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ranging autonomy over staffing, curriculum, budget, internal
organization, and many other matters (although the extent of the
autonomy varies by jurisdiction). And, like private schools, they are
schools of choice-that is, parents select them for their children, and
public funding "follows the child" to the school, as with students
participating in private school choice programs. 45
The term "charter school" is attributed to the late Albert
Shanker, the longtime president of the American Federation of
Teachers, the nation's second largest teachers' union. In a 1988 speech,
Shanker urged America to develop a "fundamentally different model of
schooling" that would "enable any school or any group of teachers ...
within a school to develop a proposal for how they could better educate
youngsters and then give them a 'charter' to implement that
proposal[.)" 46 In 1991, Minnesota enacted the first charter school law,
but the legislation fundamentally altered Shanker's proposal. The
Minnesota legislation envisioned charter schools authorized by
agencies independent from local education authorities, operated by
private entrepreneurs, and staffed with non-unionized teachers. These
changes led Shanker to reject the charter schools as a "gimmick" and
later to condemn the charter movement for "corporatizing" public
education and embracing "quick fixes that won't fix anything." 47 But the
Minnesota model, characterized by private operators and independence
from local school authorities, rather than the Shanker model, which
envisioned experimentation within the traditional public school sector,
led the expansion of charter schools to other states over time.
The charter school concept expanded rapidly. Nineteen states had
enacted charter school statutes by 1995. 48 Today, charter schools are

ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01
/NAPCS-CMO-EMO-DASHBOARD-DETAILS_20111103T102812.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/M77S-7UBQ] (describing and providing statistics on CMO and EMO public
charter schools).
45. FINN, JR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 134-38.
46. Albert Shanker, Restructuring Our Schools, 65 PEABODY J. EDUC. 88, 97-98 (1988). Ray
Budde, an education professor at the University of Massachusetts, apparently suggested the
concept-and used the term-over a decade earlier. Susan Saulny, Ray Budde, 82, First to Propose
Charter Schools, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/21/us/raybudde-82-first-to-propose-charter-schools-dies.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/KWR2-RFLT].
47. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: How
TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 122-24 (2010); Paul E. Peterson, No, Al
Shanker Did Not Invent the Charter School, EDUC. NEXT (July 21, 2010), http://educationnext.org
/no-al-shanker-did-not-invent-the-charter-school/ [https://perma.cc/6KTN-9TGDJ.
48. See Charter School FAQ, PBS: CLOSING ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2004), http://www.pbs.org
/closingtheachievementgap/faq.html [https://perma.cc/B2B3-KXGA] (stating when and where the
first charter school opened).
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authorized in forty-three states and the District of Columbia. 49 The
number of charter schools and students enrolled in them rose quickly
as well. In the first decade of their existence, nearly thirteen hundred
charter schools opened; during the 2014-2015 school year, there were
over sixty-five hundred schools serving more than 2.5 million students.
Charter school enrollment continues to grow exponentially: in the past
decade, the number of students enrolled in charter schools has
increased by 255 percent. In 2013-2014 alone, six hundred charter
schools opened, and an additional 288,000 students enrolled in charter
schools-a thirteen percent increase over the previous school year. 50 A
substantial and increasing percentage of students in many urban school
districts is enrolled in charter schools, including (in 2015-2016) ninetytwo percent in New Orleans, Louisiana, fifty-three percent in Detroit
and Flint, Michigan, and forty-five percent in Washington, D.C. 51 (See
Figure 1.) During the 2015-2016 school year, charter schools enrolled
more than thirty percent of public schools students in seventeen
districts and more than ten percent in 190 districts. 52 Additionally,
many districts are projecting (and indeed encouraging) substantial
increases in charter school enrollment in coming years, as discussed in
more detail below. 53

49. The Public Charter Schools Dashboard, NAT'LALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (2015),
http:/!dashboard. publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/year/2014 [https://perma.cc/D7VU-V 48C].
Two states, Washington and Alabama, have enacted charter school legislation since 2014. See
Alabama Enacts a Public Charter School Law; Joins 42 States and D.C., supra note 26; Donna
Gordon Blankinship, Washington High Court to Hear Charter-Schools Case, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct.
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-high-court-to-h ear-charter2014),
26,
schools-case/ [https://perma.cc/MNU7-8RFF] (stating that Washington's first charter school
opened in fall 2014).
50. See Charter School Enrollment Up 13 Percent This Year, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER SCHS. (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/press/charter-school-enrollment-13percent-year/ [https://perma.cc/TM8E-KSUS] (discussing statistics regarding the increase in
public charter school enrollment).
51. See A Growing Movement: America's Largest Charter Public School Communities, and
Their Impact on Student Outcomes, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. 3 (Nov. 2016),
http://www.publiccharters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/CharterSchoolEnrollmentShareReport2016. pdf [https://perma.cc/BV2A5ZBR] (presenting statistics of charter school enrollment).
52. Id. at 2.
53. For example, a 2012 report commissioned from the Boston Consulting Group by the
Philadelphia School Reform Commission (the entity that has operated the Philadelphia public
school system since the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania assumed control of the district over a
decade ago) predicted that, in the next five years, total charter school enrollment in Philadelphia
would grow from roughly a quarter to forty percent of all public school students. See Transforming
Philadelphia's Public Schools, Bos. CONSULTING GROUP 6-9 (2012), http://webgui.phila.kl2.pa.us
/uploads/v_llF/v_IFJYCOr72CBKDpRrGAAQ/BCG-Summary-Findings-and-Recommend ations
_August_2012. pdf [https://perma.cc/2PVF-2FTJ].
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FIGURE 1: CHARTER SCHOOL MARKET SHARE BY SCHOOL DISTRICT
THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 2015-2016
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State regulation of charter schools differs across a number of
variables, including the total number of charter schools permitted, 54 the
number and types of entities empowered to act as charter authorizers
(e.g., some states limit this function to public school districts while
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others have special government commissions and still others allow
universities and even private nonprofit entities to authorize charter
schools), accountability for academic performance, and, importantly for
present purposes, the extent of autonomy from various public education
regulations. 55 Since sector-agnostic reform strategies focusing on
increasing the supply of "high performing seats," charter school
performance (and accountability for performance) has become a major
issue in education reform debates. 56 It is widely accepted that there is
tremendous variation in quality among charter schools. As a recent
article in Slate observed, "There are some great ones but also some real
duds." 57 The question of whether charter schools, on average,
outperform traditional public schools remains deeply contested. Critics
suggest that reformers are excessively starry-eyed about charter school ·
performance, when there is little evidence that the charter schools
perform better than traditional public schools. 58 Some high-profile

54. The Obama Administration has taken steps to eliminate numerical limits on charter
schools, including conditioning access to federal Race to the Top funds and the approval of No
Child Left Behind waivers on states agreeing to lift charter school "caps." See infra notes 135-143
and accompanying text.
55. The Center for Education Reform maintains a comprehensive database of charter
regulations by states and "grades" based upon the regulatory landscape, with less regulation
earning states higher grades. See Choice and Charter Schools: Laws and Legislation, CTR. FOR
EDUC. REFORM (2016), https://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislati on/
[https://perma.cc/H9SV-JPW3]; see also Public Accountability for Charter Schools: Standards and
Policy Recommendations for Effective Oversight, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM (2014),
http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/CharterAccountabilit yStds.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FZJ2-77G2] (analyzing current charter laws and regulations).
56. This view is reflected in the Center for Education Reform's rating system for state charter
school laws, which rates state's on an A-F scale across a variety of factors, such as "autonomy"
from state education rules-including academic accountability regulations. Charter School Law
Rankings and Scorecard, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM (2014), https://www.edreform.com/wp[https://perma.cc/5B8Fcontent/uploads/2014/03/2014CharterSchoolLawScorecardLink.pdf
VM76]. Some evidence suggests that parents overestimate the academic performance of the
children's charter school, and there is uncontroverted evidence that parents value factors other
than academic performance when choosing among educational options. These are obviously not
the same thing. The fact that parents prioritize factors other than school performance-for
example, discipline and safety-does not necessarily make them poor consumers of charter schools.
See JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR HYPE? 115-70 (2007)
(analyzing parental choice of schools).
57. Ray Fisman, Do Charter Schools Work? Yes, but Not Always for Everyone, SLATE (May
22, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_dismal_science/2 013/05
/do_charter_schools_work_a_new_study_of_boston_schools_says_yes.html [https://perma.cc/AG52
-BT7A].
58. See William J. Mathis, NCLB's Ultimate Restructuring Alternatives: Do They Improve
the Quality of Education? GREAT LAKES CTR. FOR EDUC. RES. & PRAC. (Apr. 2009),
http://greatlakescenter.org/docs/Policy_Briefs/Mathis_Restructuring.p df [https://perma.cc/J52EE5MK]; see also Eileen M. O'Brien & Charles J. Dervarics, Which Way Up? What Research Says
About School Turnaround Strategies, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. 11-13 (May 2013), http://www
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studies, including a very influential study conducted in 2009 by
Stanford University's Center for Research on Educational Outcomes
("CREDO"), have found that charter schools do not outperform their
public school counterparts. 59 More recent studies, however, including
the 2013 update to the earlier CREDO study, have found that charter
schools do perform better than public schools, at least in certain age
ranges and subject areas. 60 The emerging consensus among education
scholars is that even if charter schools do not perform better overall
than traditional public schools, they do, on average, a better job-in
some cases, a much better job-at educating disadvantaged urban
students, especially minority students and English language learners.
While tremendous regional variations persist, a growing body of
evidence confirms that, on average, disadvantaged minority students
perform significantly better across a range of measures when enrolled
in charter rather than traditional public schools. 61 This is particularly

.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Policies/Which-Way-Up-At-a-glance/Which-Way-UpFull-Report. pdf [https://perma.cc/84GB-X27D].
59. The 2009 CREDO study of sixteen states found charter school students gained seven
fewer days in reading and twenty-two fewer days in math than public school students. The study
also found that charter performance varied across state policy environments. For example, student
performance was lower in states that capped the number of charter schools and higher in states
that limited the number of charter authorizers. Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in
16 States, CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES 38, http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE
_CHOICE_ CREDO.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RW5-G48F].
60. The 2013 CREDO study of twenty-six states and the District of Columbia found that
charter schools had closed the performance gap with public schools. The researchers found that
charter students were now outperforming public school students reading (gaining an additional
eight days of learning each year) and were on par with public school students in terms of math
gains. The researchers also found that students in poverty, minority students, and English
language learners gain significantly more days of learning each year in both reading and math
compared to their traditional public school peers. See National Charter School Study 2013, CTR.
FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES (2013), http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013
%20Final%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NBJ-6CRB]; see also, e.g., Julian R. Betts & Y. Emily
Tang, The Effect of Charter Schools on Student Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of the Literature,
CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. (Oct. 2011), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_NCSRP
_BettsTang_Octl 1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV4W-AW8N] (analyzing randomized assignment
studies and concluding that charter elementary schools outperform traditional public schools in
both reading and math, but charter high schools have no effects and that urban charter schools
perform better than suburban and rural charter schools).
61. See Joshua D. Angrist et al., Student Achievement in Massachusetts' Charter Schools,
HARVARD UNIV. CTR. FOR EDUC. POL'y RES. (Jan. 2011), http://economics.mit.edu/files/6493
[https://perma.cc/5SRF-HYV6]; Fisman, supra note 57 ("Charters in rural or suburban areas don't
do any better than public schools, while in urban areas they are associated with greater test score
improvements ...."); Caroline M. Hoxby, Sonali Murarka & Jenny Kang, How New York City's
Charter Schools Affect Achievement, N.Y.C. CHARTER SCH. EVALUATION PROJECT, (Sept. 2009),
http://users.nber.org/-schools/charterschoolseval/how_NYC_charter_schools_affect_achievement
_sept2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/46NN-LQP3]; National Charter School Study 2013, supra note 60;
NCEE Study Snapshot:. The Evaluation of Charter School Impacts, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
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heartening in light of the fact that a majority of charter schools are
located in urban areas and serve minority students. 62
At least three related factors may explain the divergence in
charter school performance between urban and suburban/rural
communities (where charter schools arguably perform worse than their
public school competitors): 63 The first is that the baseline academic
performance of traditional public schools is higher in suburban/rural
areas than in urban areas. The second is the emergence and growth of
high-performing charter management organizations ("CMOs")
operating multiple charter schools, which have fueled the rapid
expansion of charter schools over the last decade. 64 Many of the most
successful CMOs operate networks of charter schools that focus
intentionally on educating disadvantaged urban populations,65 such as
the Knowledge is Power Program ("KIPP") network of schools, which
has grown since the early 1990s from two to two hundred schools
serving eighty thousand students. 66 The third is that efforts to replicate
successful charter schools have gained steam, including most recently
in the ESSA, which specifically earmarks funds for highperformingcharter-school replication efforts. 67
EVALUATION & REGIONAL ASSISTANCE (June 2010), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104029/pdf/
20104031.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YU9-LJP2].
62. In 2011-2012, fifty-two percent of charter schools were located in urban areas, 'and
nearly sixty percent of charter school students were racial minorities. The Public Charter Schools
Dashboard: Schools by Geographic Locale, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS.,
http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/locale/year/201 4 [https://perma.cc/BAP3SER9]; The Public Charter Schools Dashboard: Students by Race and Ethnicity, NAT'L ALLIANCE
FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/students/page/race/year/201 4
[https://perma.cc/RBB5-L98N].
63. See National Charter School Study 2013, supra note 60.
64. See Gary Miron & Charisse Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education
Management Organizations, NAT'L EDUC. POL'y CTR. (14th ed. Nov. 2013), http://nepc.colorado
.edu/files/emo-profiles-11-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU9L-UHD4].
65. The Public Charter Schools Dashboard: Students by Race and Ethnicity, supra note 62.
66. National Results: How We Measure Success, KIPP (2016), http://www.kipp.org/results/
national-results [https://perma.cc/N7D8-6DX2]. There are other high-performing charter school
networks serving disadvantaged students. See Achievement First Network Overview,
ACHIEVEMENT FIRST PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (2016), http://www.achievementfirst.org/schools/
network-overview/ [https://perma.cc/JQ2Y-BETL] (11,500 students in thirty-two schools); The
History of Aspire, ASPIRE PUB. SCHS. (2016), http://aspirepublicschools.org/about/history/
[https://perma.cc/92KE-J8R6] (fourteen thousand students in forty schools); Charter Schools by
http://www.uncommonschools.org/our-schools/uncommon-cities
SCHS.,
UNCOMMON
City,
[https://perma.cc/U7KW-XE46] (13,900 students in forty-nine schools); Our Model, YES PREP PUB.
SCH., http://www.yesprep.org/our-model (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7 4HJ-SPYZ]
(11,600 students in sixteen campuses).
67. Arianna Prothero, Federal Charter School Grant Program Gets Big Boosts From Budget,
ESSA, EDUC. WK. (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:29 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2015/
12/federal_charter_school_grant_program_gets_big_boosts_in_budge t_essa.html [https://perma
.cc/A8PP-CJ5B].
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Early charter school proponents did not anticipate the
emergence of CMOs but expected (and hoped) that charter schools
would be freestanding schools operated by community organizations or
groups of parents and teachers. The emergence of successful CMOs,
however, arguably has driven improvement in charter schools,
especially in urban areas. Although there is a slight, but statistically
significant, difference in the overall performance of CMO-operated
charter schools vis-a-vis independent charter schools, the evidence
suggests that CMO-operated charter schools produce strong academic
gains for minority students as compared to minority students enrolled
in traditional public schools or independent charter schools. 68 A growing
body of research suggests that certain features of successful CM Os are
replicable, and this research-together with the success of a number of
school networks like KIPP-has fueled charter school replication
efforts. 69 Tremendous resources, both public and private, have been and
are being expended to replicate and grow high-performing charter
school networks. Two "venture philanthropy" organizations-the New
Schools Venture Fund and the Charter School Growth Fund-have
collectively invested $335 million in growth and replication efforts. 70
Major charitable foundations, including the Gates Foundation, the
Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family Foundation, have invested
hundreds of millions more. 71 In recent years, the federal government
has begun to focus charter school funding initiatives on efforts to

68. Charter School Growth and Replication: Executive Summary, CTR FOR RES. EDUC.
OUTCOMES 6 (Jan. 30, 2013), https://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/CGAR%20Growth%20Executive
%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QWX-NT3V].
69. See Robin Lake et al., Learning from Charter School Management Organizations:
Strategies for Student Behavior and Teacher Coaching, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. &
MATHEMATICA POL'Y RES. (Mar. 2012), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_CMO
_Strategies_mar12_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PR92-SVQN];
Replicating
Quality:
Policy
Recommendations to Support the Replication and Growth of High-performing Charter Schools and
Networks, NAT'L ASS'N CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS (Jan. 2014), http://www.qualitycharters.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ReplicatingQuality_Report.2014.01. pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7LUAE9K].
70. About Us, CHARTER SCH. GROWTH FUND (2016), http://chartergrowthfund.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/65B7-HCH3]; Tony Wan, NewSchools Spins Off New, For-Profit Venture Fund,
EDSURGE (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.edsurge.com/n/2015-01-26-newschools-spins-off-new-forprofit-venture-fund [https://perma.cc/DX67-6D9U].
71. 2009--2010 Foundation Report, BROAD FOUND. (2010), http://broadfoundation.org/
reports/2009- lOfoundationrreportseport.pdf [https://perma.cc/QFW9-BZEQ]; Investment to
Accelerate Creation of Strong Charter Schools, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (2016),
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2003/06/Investing-in-HighQualityCharter-Schools [https://perma.cc/67BP-BMAS]; Luisa Kroll, Sam Walton's Granddaughter Has
Plans to Fix Public Education in America, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 7:16 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/luisakroll/ 2014/12/01/sam-waltons-granddaughter-has-plans-to-fix-public-educationin-america/ #75c7dc5c5b76 [https://perma.cc/XWA4-R6PQ].
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replicate high-performing charter schools, 72 states have intensified
efforts to hold charter schools accountable for academic performance, 73
and local leaders have increasingly proactively recruited highperforming CM Os to open schools in their communities. 74 The early
evidence suggests that these efforts are working. Not only has the
overall performance of charter schools improved, but the percent of
charter school students enrolled in higher-performing charter schools is
on the rise. 75
3. A Quieter Revolution: The Growth of Private School Choice
While now substantially eclipsed by charter schools, private
school choice has a much older historical pedigree. The argument that
parents should be given the option of spending public education funds
to enroll their children in private schools usually is attributed to Nobel
laureate economist Milton Friedman. In a 1955 article, Friedman
argued that the injection of competition into the market for K12
education enabled by what he called "vouchers" would improve overall
academic performance across educational sectors. 76 The case for private
school choice, however, predates Friedman. During the nineteenth
century, Catholic bishops vigorously but unsuccessfully demanded
public funds for students enrolled in Catholic schools on equality
grounds, arguing that the public schools of the time were effectively
72. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Education Awards $39. 7 Million in Grants to Expand High
Quality Charter Schools, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/
us-department-education-awards-397-million-grants-expand-high-qua lity-charter-schools
[https://perma.cc/UW2V-NZEQ].
73. See, e.g., Public Accountability for Charter Schools: Standards and Policy
Recommendations for Effective Oversight, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM BROWN UNIV.,
http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/CharterAccountability Stds. pelf (last visited Sept.
18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8QLM-FKYM].
74. See, e.g., Joe Ableidinger & Lucy Steiner, Incubating High-Quality Charter Schools:
Innovations in City Organizations, NAT'L CHARTER SCH. RES. CTR. (2011), https://www
.charterschoolcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/field_publication_atta chment/1043%20NCS%20W
tPaper_Incubating%20final_O_O.pdf [https://perma.cc/D37L-JDDH].
75. Michael Alison Chandler, More D.C. Students Are Attending Highest-Performing Charter
Schools, Ratings Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/more-dc-students-are-attending-highest-performing-charter -schools-ratirigs-show/
[https://perma.cc/F9YH -NU25]
2014/11/13/3d0a4cf0-6b57 -1le4-a31c-77759fcleacc_story.html
(noting that the number of students enrolled in the highest of three charter school performance
tiers in Washington, D.C. increased by nine percent between 2013-2014).
76. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 127, 132 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955); What is School Choice?, FRIEDMAN
FOUND. FOR SCH. CHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/what-is-school-choice/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2016) [https://perma.ccNEM5-4SCE] ("In 1955, Dr. Milton Friedman proposed
the idea of school vouchers, which would separate the financing and administration of schools,
effectively jumpstarting the modern school choice movement.").
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Protestant schools that were either unwelcoming of Catholic students,
determined to evangelize them, or both. 77 And James Forman, Jr. has
traced the roots of parental choice to the Reconstruction era, when freed
slaves established independent private schools, and, in some cases,
continued to prefer them even after government-established schools for
African American children emerged. 78
President Ronald Reagan and his education secretary, William
Bennett, promoted school vouchers during the early 1980s, urging
Congress to give low-income children the option of attending private
schools as an alternative to the federal funding of remedial instruction
in both public and private schools, which has been available since the
1960s.79 The idea languished, however, until two events in 1990 ignited
the modern parental choice movement. The first was the publication of
John Chubb and Terry Moe's enormously influential book, Politics,
Markets, and America's Schools. Chubb and Moe, like Friedman, saw
parental choice in education as a means of igniting competition with
public schools. "Choice," they asserted, "has the capacity all by itself to
bring about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers have
been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways." 80 The second was the
emergence of a successful if unusual political coalition in Wisconsin.
African American activists in Milwaukee-led by former Milwaukee
school superintendent Howard Fuller and a state legislator named
Polly Williams-combined forces with Republican Governor Tommy
Thompson to secure the passage of the nation's first modern school
voucher program. 81 Initially, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
entitled poor public school children in the city of Milwaukee to spend a
portion of their public education funds at secular private schools; the
program was expanded to include religious schools in 1995. 82 Ohio
followed suit in 1995, enacting a private school choice program for
77. See BRINIG & GARNE'IT, supra note 27, at 15--17.
78. James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There
First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1293-95 (2005).
79. Robert Pear, Reagan Proposes Vouchers to Give Poor a Choice of Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/14/us/reagan-proposes-vouchers-to-g ive-poor-achoice-of-schools.html [https://perma.cc/C6VP-WKJZ].
80. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 217 (1990).
81. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Maine and Vermont both have maintained "town
tuitioning'' programs, which permit students in towns without public high schools to use public
dollars to attend other public or private, secular schools. Illinois and Minnesota have very modest
nonrefundable parental tax credit programs. See The ABCs of School Choice: The Comprehensive
Guide to Every Private School Choice Program in America, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE
33-34, 55-60, 95-97 (2015), https://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-ABCs-ofSchool-Choice-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UNY-DPSK] [herein~fter The ABCs of School Choice].
82. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607-10 (Wis. 1998) (summarizing history of
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program).
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disadvantaged children in Cleveland, most of whom opted to attend
religious schools. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to the Cleveland program in the 2002 Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris decision, thus clearing the federal constitutional path
for the expansion of private school choice. 83
The fact that charter schools, rather than private school choice,
the parental choice revolution arguably is one of the most
drive
would
unexpected domestic policy developments in recent history. In contrast
to charter school policies, which were in 1991 little more than an
amorphous idea that required the establishment of new schools out of
whole cloth, voucher policies had an older, more refined intellectual
pedigree, a committed ideological base of support, and promised to
enlist existing schools with a proven track record of educating
disadvantaged kids, especially urban Catholic schools. 84 Private school
choice proponents have long drawn upon this record to build the case
for parental choice in education. Indeed, prior to the emergence of
charter schools, urban Catholic schools effectively were the case for
parental choice in education. 85
That said, private school choice faced major legal and political
obstacles. The constitutionality of permitting parents to expend public
resources at private religious schools was not settled until more than a
decade after the Wisconsin program was enacted. This was problematic
because the vast majority of private schools in the United States,
especially affordable ones, are religiously affiliated. The 2002 Zelman
decision put an end to speculation about whether vouchers violated the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause, but significant state
constitutional hurdles to parental choice remained. Specifically, thirtyseven state constitutions contain provisions that prohibit the public
funding of private "sectarian" schools. Many of these are the direct
result of an anti-Catholic backlash against prior generation's battles
over parental choice in education. These provisions are often called

83. 536 U.S. 639, 643-62 (2002).
84. Beginning with the groundbreaking research of James Coleman and Andrew Greeley,
numerous scholars have found that Catholic school students-especially poor, minority studentstend to outperform their public school counterparts. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, THOMAS HOFFER &
SALLY KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
COMPARED (1982); ANDREW GREELEY, CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND MINORITY STUDENTS 105-07
(1st ed. 1982); see also Derek Neal, The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational
Achievement, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 98, 100 (1997) (finding that Catholic school attendance increased
the likelihood that a minority student would graduate from high school from sixty-two percent to
eighty-eight percent, and more than doubled the likelihood that a similar student would graduate
from college).
85. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First
Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 344-52 (2000).
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"Blaine Amendments," after James Blaine of Maine, who attempted as
Speaker of the House in 1875 to amend the federal constitution to
prohibit the public funding of sectarian schools. Blaine's proposal
narrowly failed, but states were thereafter required to adopt similar
constitutional provisions as a condition of statehood. 86
Following Zelman, many commentators predicted that state
constitutional limits on the public funding of private and faith-based
schools would remain major impediments to the expansion of private
school choice. 87 Contrary to post-Zelman predictions, however, these
provisions have not proven to be an insurmountable obstacle to the
expansion of parental choice. Blaine Amendment challenges to private
school choice programs have been rejected by a number of state
supreme courts, including Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, Alabama, and,
most recently, North Carolina. 88 While a number of lower state courts
have relied upon Blaine Amendments to invalidate private school choice
programs, only two state supreme courts have done so. In 2009, the
Arizona Supreme Court invalidated programs that provided publicly
funded scholarships that enabled children with disabilities and children
in foster care to attend private schools, holding that they violated a
provision of the state constitution that provided, "No tax shall be laid
or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private
or sectarian school." 89 And, in June 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court
invalidated a voucher program in Douglas County, Colorado, on Blaine
Amendment grounds. 90 In January 2015, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear arguments in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley, 91 a
case alleging that the application of a Blaine Amendment to exclude a
Lutheran preschool from a public program that provided recycled
rubber tires for its playground violated the Federal Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses. The case may have

86. Richard D. Komer & Clark Neily, School Choice and State Constitutions: A Guide to
Designing School Choice Programs, INST. FOR JUST. & AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Apr. 2007),
http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/50stateSCreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/G27D-YENM].
87. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (2003); Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine
Amendments, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 45 (2004); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future:
Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 917 (2003).
88. Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79 (Ala. 2015); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013);
Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2015); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999);
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
89. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1180 (Ariz. 2009) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 10).
90. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015).
91. 788 F.3d 779, 781-91 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted 136 S. Ct. 891 (Jan. 15, 2016).
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significant implications for the future Blaine Amendment litigation in
the parental choice context.92
Even after the Supreme Court cleared the legal path for private
school choice, the political hurdles to its expansion were significant. At
least until recently, private school choice has been the proverbial "third
rail" in education policy for a variety of reasons-the opposition of
teachers' unions being the most significant one. 93 One challenge facing
private school choice proponents has been a sharp divergence between
the historical base of support for (conservative Republicans), and
intended beneficiaries of (disadvantaged minority children). Politically
conservative Republicans championed school choice at the national
level, but defection by state legislators has been a perennial
impediment to program implementation. Opposition among suburban
Republicans, who are, generally speaking, happy with their public
schools and unhappy about the prospect of poor urban students
enrolling in them, has impeded efforts to enact parental choice
programs in a number of states. 94 Suburban voters, on the other hand,
may feel less threatened by charter schools because charter schools tend
to be concentrated in urban areas, not suburban ones. As a result, the
decision of a charter operator to open a school will only indirectly affect
the operations of suburban public schools. 95
Fear of the potentially destabilizing effects of private school
choice arguably fueled the movement to enact charter laws, which in
turn took the wind out of the sails of the private school choice
movement. At least until recently, a tacit political truce existed between
supporters of traditional public schools and proponents of charter
schools, since charter schools historically have been perceived as a
"safer" and more "constrained" version of parental choice---one that is
both "public" and "secular." 96 As a result, and in contrast to private
92. See Greg Stohr, Church Playground Funding Case Accepted by U.S. Supreme Court,
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Jan. 15, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016[https://perma.cc/XH5K01-15/church-playground-funding-case-accepted-by-u-s-supreme-cour t
WV95].
93. See, e.g., TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA'S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 327-29 (2011) (discussing teacher union opposition to private school choice); Michael
Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the Expansion of School Choice
Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1932 (2012) ("Understandably, and with considerable
justification, school choice supporters reflexively blamed teachers unions for school voucher
initiative losses .... ").
94. Ryan & Heise, supra note 25, at 2088-90.
95. Id.
96. The truce has unraveled as charter school market share has grown. See, e.g., Richard D.
Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, Restoring Shanker's Vision for Charter Schools, 38 AM. EDUCATOR 4,
5 (Winter 2014-2015) ("Proposed to empower teachers, desegregate students, and allow innovation
from which the traditional public schools could learn, many charter schools instead prized
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school choice, charter schools have historically enjoyed broad,
bipartisan political support. 97 Within debates about educational
finance, many moderate reformers traditionally advocated for charter
schools as an alternative to private school choice programs such as tax
credits or vouchers. 98 For example, Michael Heise has demonstrated
that the likelihood that a state enacted or expanded a charter program
increased along with the "threat" of publicly funded private school
choice. 99 Heise hypothesizes that opponents believed that the appetite
for private school choice would decrease as the range of public school
choice options increased. Heise labels this reality as "ironic." 100 Schoolvoucher proponents often intentionally established private voucher
programs in order to fuel demand for publicly funded vouchers, but
their efforts backfired and instead fueled the political support for
charters, which in turn decreased demand for private school choice. 101
The jury is out on whether Heise's prediction will prove correct
over the long term. After languishing for years in state legislatures,
private school choice has gained significant momentum in recent years.
Today, more than half of states and the District of Columbia have
publicly funded private school choice programs. 102 Although most of
these programs serve a relatively small, targeted group of students

management control, reduced teacher voice, further segregated students, and became competitors,
rather than allies, of regular public schools."); Whitmire, supra note 12.
97. During the 2008 presidential election cycle, for example, both John McCain and Barack
Obama expressed strong support for charter schools. Soon after his election, President Obama
made charter schools a centerpiece of his education policy, pledging five billion in federal funds to
help create new charter schools and urging states without charter school laws to adopt them and
states with caps on the number of charter schools to eliminate them. Obama's Charter Stimulus,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124476693275708519 [https://perma
.cc/67XQ-2K96].
98. BUCKLEY & SCHNEIDER, supra note 56, at 3. The pro-charter/anti-voucher position has
been echoed in Democratic Party platforms in each of the last three presidential election cycles.
As the 2004 Democratic Party Platform provided, "Instead of pushing private school vouchers that
funnel scarce dollars away from the public schools, we will support public school choice, including
charter schools and magnet schools that meet the same high standards as other schools." Strong
at Home, Respected in the World: The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America,
DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM. 34 (2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/29613.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89GG-GX94].
99. Heise, supra note 93, at 1929--30.
100. Id. at 1931.
101. Id. at 1929--.30.
102. Additionally, Maine and Vermont have "tuitioning" programs that date to the midnineteenth century, which permit students in towns without a public high school to enroll in
private, non-sectarian schools, and Minnesota and Illinois have modest programs that permit
parents to claim up to $500 for educational expenses, including tuition. See The ABCs of School
Choice, supra note 81, at 33, 55, 57-59, 95; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Legal Landscape of Parental
Choice Policy, AM. ENTER. INST. 4-15 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/The-legal-landscape-of-parental-choice-policy. pdf [https://perma.cc/537S-PN 58].
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(usually low-income and/or disabled students), participation in private
school choice programs has more than tripled in the last decade to
350,000 students in 2014-2015.1° 3 And, there are reasons to believe that
the private school choice footprint will increase dramatically in the
years to come: four states' programs (including Nevada's universal
education savings account program) launch in the 2015-2016 school
year; many other programs have no participation limits and continue to
grow (for example, Indiana's Choice Scholarship Program); others
automatically expand capacity each year (for example, the Florida
Corporate Scholarship Tax Credit Program); and a number of states
without private school choice seem poised to adopt new programs. 104
FIGURE 2: PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: ENROLLMENT, 2014-2015

2014-2015* SCHOLARSHIP RECIPIENTS BY STATE
FLORIDA
ARIZONA )!lllll!!llllll!!ll!lllllll~llJl!l!llll!ll!!!lll!!lllll'
PENNSYLVANIA
INDIANA J!!lll!llll!!!l!!l!!!!lm!l!l!!IJll!!ll!!!!!llll 40,213
OHIO
38,273
WISCONSIN
29,677
GEORGIA · - - 16,668
IOWA
10,254
LOUISIANA
7,726
ALABAMA
NORTH CAROLINA
WASHINGTON D.C.
OKLAHOMA
VIRGINIA
UTAH
RHODE ISLAND
411
SOUTH CAROLINA
405
MISSISSIPPI
117
NEW HAMPSHIRE
40
*Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, and Nevada have enacted new programs since September 2014.
(Source: Alliance for School Choice, 2014-2015 School Choice Yearbook)

103. See Matt Frendewey et al., School Choice Yearbook 2014-2015, ALLIANCE FOR SCH.
CHOICE
14-15
(2015),
http://afcgrowthfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AFC_2014-15
_y earbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG25-R76B].
104. See generally, e.g., The ABCs of School Choice, supra note 81.
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FIGURE 3: PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: GROWTH

RECENTSTUDENTENROLLMENTGROWTHIN
PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS
(BY THE THOUSANDS)
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(Source: Alliance for School Choice, 2014-2015 School Choice Yearbook)

There are several reasons why the movement for private school
choice may be gaining momentum. First, at least from the perspective
of public school proponents, the "charter compromise" may have
backfired by opening the doors to a dramatic expansion in parenta_l
choice. Not only have charter schools drawn millions of students away
from public schools, but by acculturating parents to a school choice
environment, the explosion in charter schools may have delegitimized
arguments against private school choice. Second, in contrast to years
past, teachers' unions often have more immediate and higher-priority
battles to fight than private school choice, including the rapid expansion
of charter schools and the increasing focus on accountability and valueadded teacher evaluation practices in the traditional public school
sector. 105 Third, beginning with Arizona in 1997, more than a dozen
states have adopted a new, and arguably more politically palatable,
private school choice device. 106 Known as "scholarship tax credits,"
105. See, e.g., Emma Brown, Contentious Teacher-Related Policies Moving From Legislature
to Courts, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/
contentious-teacher-related-policies-moving-from-legislatures-to-the-courts/2015/02/28/6ec lf31 eb83d-1 le4-aa05- lce812b3fdd2_story .html [https://perma.cc/3UTB-5HCU].
106. A 2014 poll conducted by Education Next found that support for supporting school choice
through tax credits was actually higher than support for charter schools, with sixty percent of
respondents supporting tax credit policies but only fifty-four percent supporting charter schools.
Michael B. Henderson, Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West, No Common Opinion on the Common
Core, 15 EDUC. NEXT 9, 15 (Winter 2015), http://education:iJ.ext.org/2014-ednext-poll-no-commonopinion-on-the-common-core/ [https://perma.cc/ZY9M-3PFG].
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these programs do not directly fund private school scholarships, but
rather incentivize donations to private scholarship organizations. 107
Scholarship tax credits also may offer a way around the state
constitutional restrictions discussed above. For example, while the
Arizona Supreme Court relied on the state's Blaine Amendment to
invalidate a voucher program, it had previously rejected a Blaine
Amendment challenge to the state's scholarship tax credit program,
suggesting that tax credits may be an option even in states with
restrictive Blaine Amendments. 108 In Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn, the Court held that the plaintiffs in the case
lacked standing to challenge the program because the funds at issueprivate donations incentivized by the tax credit program-were not
governmental,
effectively
immumzmg
them
from
federal
Establishment Clause challenges. 109 Several state courts have followed
suit, holding that taxpayers lack standing to challenge scholarship tax
credit programs.no More recently, three states-Arizona, Florida,
Nevada-have adopted an innovative school choice device known as
"education savings accounts," which empowers parents to spend state
education funds on a range of educational expenses, including private
school tuition, and/or ''bank" it for later use. rn
Finally, two decades after parental choice was first introduced
into the American educational landscape, the political coalition
supporting private school choice has expanded and diversified.
Although public opinion polls suggest that support for parental choice
is today highest among disadvantaged and minority parents, the
primary political proponents have traditionally been white and

107. The nation's three largest private school choice programs (in terms of enrollment)-in
Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania-are all scholarship tax credit programs, although the
scholarships awarded through these programs tends to be smaller than traditional "voucher"
programs. Frendewey et al., supra note 103, at 10.
108. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 609-25 (Ariz. 1999).
109. 563 U.S. 125, 129-46 (2010).
110. See, e.g., Travis Pillow, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Challenging Florida Tax Credit
Scholarships, REDEFINED (May 18, 2015), https://www.redefinedonline.org/2015/05/judgeplaintiffs-lack-standing-to-challenge-florida-tax-credit-scholarships/
[https://perma.cc/5GRR59U2].
111. See Empowerment Scholarship Account Program, ARIZ. DEP'T EDUC., http://www.azed
.gov/esa/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/G6U9-V9W6]; Stephanie Linn, Florida
Governor Signs Nation's Second ESAs, Expands Tax-Credit Scholarships, EDCHOICE (June 20,
2014), https://www.edchoice.org/ blog/florida-governor-signs-nations-second-esas-expands-taxcredit-scholarships/ [https://perma .cc/Y987-S2RM]; Welcome to the Nevada Education Savings
Account Program, NEV. STATE TREASURER, http://www.nevadatreasurer.gov/SchoolChoice/Home/
(last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/H38R-LQPL].
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conservative. 112 In recent years, fueled in part by a shift in messaging,
away from a discussion of "markets" and toward the imperative of
giving poor parents options for their children, support among elected
leaders for private school choice has begun to cross party and
demographic lines. 113 In this important sense, the historical evolution
of American education policy described above has led to the point where
once-disparate arguments for charter schools and private school choice
have converged on a single, sector-agnostic argument for high quality
educational options. As Terry Moe has observed:
The modern arguments for vouchers have less to do with free markets than with social
equity. They also have less to do with theory than with the commonsense notion that
disadvantaged kids should never be forced to attend failing schools and that they should
be given as many attractive educational opportunities as possible. 114

It remains to be seen whether the private school choice footprint
will expand to the point of contributing meaningfully to sector agnostic
education reform. At present, the number of children enrolled in private
schools as a result of a publicly funded private school choice program
(approximately 350,000 in 2014-2015) pales in comparison to the
number of students enrolled in charter schools (2.9 million during the
same year). 115 Moreover, the universe of affordable urban private
schools has been shrinking, a trend fueled in large part by the closure
of thousands of urban Catholic schools over the past several decades. 116
And, as with charter schools, questions remain as to whether private
school choice programs produce their promised academic gains. The
effects of private school choice on standardized test scores appear to be
positive but marginal, although the longer-term effects on non-cognitive
variables like high school graduation rates is significant. 117 Given these
realities, rhetoric about the need to increase educational options across
multiple educational sectors may ultimately simply fuel more growth in

112. See, e.g., Katie Ash, Black Parents in South Favor Increased School Choice, Says New
Survey, EDUC. WK. (July 24, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2013/
07 /black_parents_want_more_school_choices_says_new_survey. html
[https://perma.cc/RL 7TKCS4]; Diana Jean Schemo, Program on Vouchers Draws Minority Support, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/06/education/06voucher.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/
A7WD-7KMY].
113. See MOE, supra, note 93, at 329.
114. Id.
115. See Matt Frendewey et al., supra note 103, at 14-15; Estimated Number of Public
Charter Schools & Students, 2014-2015, supra note 5, at 1.
116. See BRINIG & GARNETT, supra note 27, at ix.
117. See, e.g., Cecilia Elena Rouse & Lisa Barrow, School Vouchers and Student Achievement:
Recent Evidence, Remaining Questions, (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., WP-2008-08, Aug. 6, 2008),
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2008/wp2008_08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PV9-D5GH].
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the charter school sector rather than a movement toward genume
educational pluralism in our urban areas.

B. Education Accountability Policies
If the rise in parental choice options outside the traditional
public school sector represented the first step on the path toward sector
agnosticism, the second step began within it, a decade after parental
choice took hold in Wisconsin (with vouchers) and Minnesota (with
charters), when Congress enacted NCLB in 2001. 118 Now widely
condemned and dramatically overhauled in the recent ESSA, NCLB
enjoyed widespread bipartisan support at the time of its enactment.
Championed by President George W. Bush and Senator Ted Kennedy,
NCLB was an expansive and dramatic update to the 1965 Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"), which originally
focused primarily on providing supplemental resources for schools
serving disadvantaged children. 119 Through a series of amendments,
the focus of the ESEA had evolved from solely supporting low-income
students in disadvantaged communities to improving schools, 12 0 but the
2002 NCLB amendment to ESEA expanded the focus on school
improvement even further. 121 In a 2000 speech to the NAACP, President
George W. Bush had vowed to overcome the "soft bigotry of low

118. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is a federal Spending Clause statute. 20 U.S.C.
§ 6319 (repealed Dec. 10, 2015).
119. Janet T. Thomas & Kevin P. Brady, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act at 40:
Equity, Accountability, and the Evolving Federal Role in Public Education, 29 REV. RES. EDUC. 51,
51 (2005) (arguing that the ESEA was "[e]nacted to offer equitable educational opportunities to
the nation's disadvantaged" and "provide[d] financial resources to schools to enhance the learning
experiences of underprivileged children"). As originally enacted, the main provision of the ESEA
was Title I, "Financial Assistance to Local Educational Agencies for the Education of Low-Income
Families." Title I provides public block grants to states to distribute these funds to local education
agencies to support disadvantages students. Title II, which was at issue in the Mitchell v. Helms
decision discussed infra at notes 185 and 190-193, provides grant opportunities to states "for the
acquisition of school library resources, textbooks, and other printed and published instructional
materials for the use of children and teachers in public and private elementary and secondary
schools." Title III provides federal dollars through grants "for supplementary educational centers
and services, to stimulate and assist in the provision of vitally needed educational services not
available in sufficient quantity or quality." Title IV provides support for "Educational Research
and Training"-that is, grants to research institutions, including colleges and universities, to
enhance educational research efforts. These title programs continue to provide resources to schools
serving disadvantaged students. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §
6301 (amended 2001).
120. Andrea Boyle & Katelyn Lee, Title I at 50: A Retrospective, AM. INSTS. FOR RES. 5-7
(2015), http://www.air.org/sites/default/files/downloads/report/Title-I-at-50-A- Retrospective-July2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZP5-2KP6].
121. Id. at 7.
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expectations." 122 In championing NCLB, Bush made clear that he
intended to do so by holding public schools accountable for student
academic performance. In his speech celebrating the signing of the
landmark legislation, Bush declared:
The fundamental principle of this bill is that every child can learn, we expect every child
to learn, and you must show us whether or not every child is learning .... And now it's
up to you, the local citizens of our great land, the compassionate, decent citizens of
America, to stand up and demand high standards, and to demand that no child-not one
single child in America-is left behind.123

At the core of NCLB were a number of measures designed to
improve student achievement by holding states and schools more
accountable for student progress: NCLB required states to administer
standardized tests aligned with state academic standards in reading
and mathematics and to bring all students-one hundred percent-up
to the "proficient" level on these tests by the 2013-2014 school year.
NCLB also required states to ensure that school districts and individual
schools make "adequate yearly progress" toward this goal for both their
student populations as a whole and for certain demographic
subgroups. 124 Beginning in the 2002-2003 school year, NCLB required
annual report cards including student-achievement data broken down
by subgroup for both schools and school districts. Schools and school
districts were held accountable for student test scores on state
administered standardized achievement tests, graduation rates, and
other measurable objectives set by individual states. 125 Originally,
President Bush proposed that students enrolled in persistently failing
schools be given vouchers to attend a private school, but the
controversial private school choice provision eventually was replaced
with a requirement that students enrolled in persistently failing schools
be permitted to transfer to other higher-performing public schools. 126
Beginning in 2007, the Department of Education's School
Improvement Grant ("SIG") program provided unprecedented amounts
122. President George W. Bush, Address at the NAACP's 91st Convention (July 10, 2000),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/bushtext0 71000.html [https://perma
.cc/29A9-228R].
123. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Signs Landmark No
Child Left Behind Education Bill (Jan. 8, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2002/01120020108-1.html [https://perma.cc/LQE9-5UEZ].
124. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2006) (repealed Dec. 10, 2015) ("Each State shall establish a
timeline for adequate yearly progress. The timeline shall ensure that not later than 12 years
after the end of the 2001-2002 school year, all students ... will meet or exceed the State's
proficient level of academic achievement on the State assessments ....").
125. No Child Left Behind, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/nochild-left-behind/ [https://perma.cc/G3GF-QYUZ ].
126. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 1116(b)(5), 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(5)
(~epealed Dec. 10, 2015).
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of federal dollars to improve the nation's lowest performing schools. 127
The SIG program-eliminated in the ESSA, which provides other
sources of school turn around funds 128-provided grants to states to
fund school district interventions to turn around low-achieving schools
identified under the NCLB accountability system. The SIG program
required districts to divide their schools into four academic "tiers" and
conditioned federal funding on the implementation of one of four
intervention methods in the lowest performing schools: turnaround (all
teachers and the principal are fired and a new staff hired, although the
new principal can rehire up to fifty percent of the original teachers);
transformation (the school principal is fired and the new principal
required to implement various accountability and professional
development strategies); restart (the school is closed and reopened as a
charter school or privately managed public school); or closure (the school
is closed and its students transferred to higher-achieving schools in the
district). 129 However, the law also allowed districts to take "[a]ny other
major restructuring that makes fundamental reforms." 130
By the time that President Obama was elected in 2008, the
support for NCLB had entirely evaporated. The goal of one hundred
percent proficiency was unrealistic. In 2014-the established deadline
for achieving universal proficiency-the National Assessment .of
Educational Progress, which is administered annually to a subset of
127. Christy Wolfe, Using School Improvement Grant Funds to Increase Access to HighQuality Public Schools, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. 1, 1 (Sept. 2014), http://www
.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/NAPCS-PolicySnapsh ot-SI G-r 1. pdf
[https://perma.cc/QYC5-PXZK],
128. Klein, supra note 15.
129. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 1003, 20 U.S.C. § 6303(b)(5)
(amended Dec. 10, 2015); see also Guidance on Fiscal Year 2010 School Improvement Grants, U.S.
DEP'T EDUC. (Nov. 1, 2010), htt!J:l/www2.ed.gov/programs/sif/sigguidancel1012010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XPY3-J4LH] (clarifying intervention requirements to receive SIG funds); Tina
Trujillio & Michelle Renee, Democratic School Turnarounds: Pursuing Equity and Learning from
Evidence, NAT'L EDUC. POL'y CTR. 1, 3 (Oct. 2012), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/pbturnaroundequity_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN6W-88WV] (summarizing NCLB penalties).
130. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 1116(b)(8)(B)(v) (repealed Dec. 10,
2015). Although accurate data is difficult to obtain, these legal requirements apparently have not
directly triggered many school closures. In 2007-2008, the Center on Education Policy found that
3,500 schools were "in" or "planning" restructuring as a result of NCLB. Unfortunately, a high
percentage of districts opting to employ "other" restructuring options, rather than the four set forth
in NCLB, makes it difficult to determine what, exactly, "restructuring" meant in any given context.
Caitlin Scott, A Call to Restructure Restructuring: Lessons from the NCLB Act in Five States, CTR.
ON EDUC. POL'y 1, 1 (Sept. 2008), http://www.cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=l 75
[https://perma.cc/Q98H- 7AL5]. A more recent report found that only fourteen states reported using
the "closure" model and twelve reported using the "restart" model (usually the conversion to a
charter school) to address failing schools. Sarah Yatsko et aL, Tinkering Toward Transformation,
CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. 1, 3 (Mar. 2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED532630.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JF3J-AFND].
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fourth and eighth graders, found that "proficiency" rates were below
fifty percent in both reading and math in 4th and 8th grade. The only
exceptions were for Asians in all subjects and whites in 4th grade
math. 131 NCLB also fueled a widespread backlash against standardized
testing, as states, districts, and schools chaffed at the embarrassment
of reporting their failure to make the required adequate yearly progress
toward proficiency .132
When President Obama entered office, he and his Secretary of
Education, Arne Duncan, made clear their intention to move away from
the NCLB accountability model toward other reform measures that
they believed would more effectively promote academic gains and
address the achievement gap. Their first opportunity to do so came with
the enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the
"ARRA," more commonly known as the "Stimulus Act"), which
appropriated funds to promote school improvement and directed that
the funds be distributed by the Secretary of Education. 133 The Act
required states to request ARRA funds, 134 referring to provisions of
NCLB as guiding principles when determining when a state must
support "struggling schools." 135 The program devised by the Obama
administration to distribute these funds, dubbed "Race to the Top,"
went further. The Race to the Top program established a competitive
process, which distributed the funds based upon certain criteria.
Implementing the school intervention tactics specified in NCLB was
one of the criteria used for rating state proposals, but it was prioritized
relative to the others, which included "articulating a comprehensive
and coherent reform agenda"; developing and adopting "common"
standards and assessments (a tacit reference to the development of the
Common Core State Standards); 136 using data to support classroom
instruction; implementing data-driven, value-added teacher evaluation
and compensation procedures; and "ensuring successful conditions for
high-performing charter schools and other innovative schools." The
final criteria in particular represented a signal that the Department of
Education was willing to use its funding authority to move states
131. Anya Kamenetz, It's 2014. All Children Are Supposed To Be Proficient. What Happened?,
NPR ED. (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2014/10/11/354931351/it-s-2014-all-childrenare-su pposed-to-be-proficient-under-federal-law [https://perma.cc/XTJ 6-7W7F].
132. See R.AVITCH, supra note 47.
133. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14001, 123 Stat.
115, 279 (2012).
134. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 14005(a); see§ 14006(b) (stipulating
that the Secretary will determine which states receive funding based on their applications).
135. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 14005(d)(5).
136. COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE (2016), http://www.corestandards.org/ (last
visited Sept. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7NTC-L4R4].
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toward sector-agnostic education policies: states were encouraged to
eliminate numerical caps upon the number of charter schools or total
charter school enrollment, to hold charter schools accountable for
academic performance and close underperforming schools, to provide
capital funding-in addition to per-pupil funding-for charter schools,
and to equalize the funding between traditional public schools and
charter schools. 137
In 2011, the Department of Education invited states to request
waivers from ten of NCLB's school-accountability requirements. 138 The
Department of Education justified this departure from NCLB as a way
of recognizing and rewarding states for initiating "ground breaking
reforms and innovations" that "were not anticipated when the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 was enacted." 139 States seeking a waiver
submitted a lengthy application containing evidence of at least three
core areas of reform. First, the state must have made plans to assess
student growth against "college- and career-ready standards that are
common to a number of states," e.g., the Common Core State
Standards. 140 Second, the state must have implemented a
"differentiated recognition, accountability, and support system" that is
"designed to improve student achievement and school performance,
close achievement gaps, and increase the quality of instruction for
students." The waiver policy required states to divide public schools into
three categories: high-performing "reward schools," lower performing
"focus schools," and the lowest-performing "priority schools." With
respect to the bottom two categories, states were required to just specify
a plan of action for improving student achievement and holding
districts accountable for school turnarounds. Third, as with Race to the
Top, the waiver policy required the implementation of a data-driven
system of principal and teacher evaluation. 141

137. See Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. 1, 11 (Nov. 2009),
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CAL8UB4U].
138. Section 9401 of the ESEA permits the federal government to waive certain provisions,
although there is some dispute as to whether the Obama administration's waiver practices exceed
this waiver authority by effectively overhauling NCLB altogether. 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2006).
139. Letter from Arne Duncan, Sec'y of Educ., to Chief State Sch. Officers (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/l l 0923.html [https://perma.cc/X7YA-4TK9].
140. The Department of Education expressly disavows "requiring'' the adoption of the
Common Core as a condition of receiving a waiver. See ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (May
5, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html [https://perma.cc/7YJBVQVY] (explaining that states may request flexibility regarding ESEA requirements in exchange
for "rigorous and comprehensive State-developed plans").
141. ESEA Flexibility Request, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/
elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html [https://perma.cc/7YJB-VQVY].
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The future of accountability as a pillar of federal education
policy is currently in flux. As previously noted, in December 2015eight years after the date of NCLB's expiration-Congress signed the
ESSA The ESSA (which, like NCLB, was a reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965) eliminated many of
NCLB's most onerous and unpopular accountability requirements,
including the requirement that schools and districts make "adequate
yearly progress" toward proficiency. While the ESSA continues to
require that schools test students annually and make public
information about school performance, the law gives states more
latitude to shape standardized tests and mandates the inclusion of at
least one non-cognitive measure of school quality .142 The legislation also
eliminates all ESEA waivers, which were phased out by August 1,
2016. 143

C. The Convergence of Choice and Accountability:
From Turn-Arounds to Turn-Overs
No Child Left Behind ushered in an era of school-level
accountability for academic performance. But NCLB's accountability
regime is considered a failure. Most commentators agree that many
provisions of NCLB, especially the demand for adequate yearly progress
and aspiration for one hundred percent proficiency by 2014, were a
disaster. The story, on its face, seems a simple one. The institutional
and demographic realities on the ground in traditional public schools
(especially those serving disadvantaged children) rendered the task of
improving public school performance through NCLB's "carrot and stick"
approach impossible. Thus, with efforts to revamp the law stalled in
Congress, the Obama administration necessarily stepped in to waive its
onerous, unrealistic requirements. 144 By eliminating these
requirements in the ESSA, Congress effectively acknowledged the
veracity of this story.
While this account captures the fate ofNCLB itself, it is not clear
that the demise of NCLB should be equated with the demise of school
accountability policies. The failure of NCLB highlighted in a particular

142. See Klein, supra note 15.
143. See Dear Colleague Letter from Ann Whalen, Assistant Sec'y for Elementary &
Secondary Educ., on the Transition, to ESSA (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/
elsec/leg/essa/transition-dcl.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BG9-VZQ4] (discussing the Department of
Education's expectations for ESSA implementation).
144. The U.S. Department of Education maintains a useful database on ESEA waivers. ESEA
Flexibility, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7YJB-VQVY].
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way the problem of persistent underperformance in America's public
schools. In so doing, NCLB surfaced and activated deep undercurrents
in the education-reform world-currents that are now are fueling the
demand for a child-centered sector-agnostic "high-quality seats"
approach to education reform. For all of the frustration generated by
the NCLB accountability process, the law was always more carrot than
stick. NCLB gave states and school districts a series of options
(described above), and state and local officials opted almost universally
for school reform models and eschewed more draconian measures, such
as closing and/or "restarting" persistently failing schools. While it is
true that closure of public schools for underperformance has been on
the rise since NCLB, the available data suggests that forces other than
NCLB-in particular, the economic and demographic realities facing
many urban districts-are driving school closures. 145 In fact, under the

145. On public school closure trends, see generally Garnett, supra note 43. In the 2010-2011
school year, 1,069 public schools were closed in the United States, up from 717 a decade earlier.
Id. at 290-91. The trend lines are clear. For example, in 2014, the School Reform Commission of
Philadelphia, which has operated the city's schools since a state takeover in 2001, announced plans
to shutter ten percent of the district's schools (twenty-three total) at the end of this school year.
See Jon Hurdle, Philadelphia Officials Vote to Close 23 Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/philadelphia-officials-v ote-to-close-23-schools.html
[https://perma.cc/BT2W-2V9W]; see also Emily Dowdall & Susan Warner, Shuttered Public
Schools: The Struggle to Bring Old Buildings to New Life, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/02/11/philadelphia_sch ool_closings_report.pdf·
[https://perma.cc/GW5Y-MDL7] (showing that Philadelphia school closings are part of a
countrywide trend). The Kansas City, Missouri, school district closed half its public schools in
2010. Half of Kansas City Public Schools to Close, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2010), http://usatoday30
[http://perma.cc/6WHN-Z8ML];
.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-10-Kansas-City_N.htm
Susan Saulny, Board's Decision to Close 28 Kansas City Schools Follows Years of Inaction, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/us/12schools.html?_r=O [https://perma
.cc/7FDM-QYKH]. In New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg has closed over 150 public schools
during his tenure; Chicago closed eighty-two schools between 2001 and 2009 and an additional
fifty in the spring of 2013. See Noreem S. Ahmed-Ullah & John Chase, Anxiety Grows as CPS
Releases Preliminary School Closings List, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/2013-02-14/news/chi-129-on-new-chicago-schools-closing-list-201 30213_1_commission-onschool-utilization-barbara-byrd-bennett-dwayne-truss [https://perma.cc/T8VU-QC88]; Marisa de
la Torre & Julia Gwynne, When Schools Close: Effects on Displaced Students in Chicago Public
Schools, CONSORTIUM ON CHI. SCH. RES. UNIV. CHI. 1, 1 (Oct. 2009), http://consortium.uchicago
[https://perma.cc/LRE 7.edu/sites/default/files/publications/CCSRSchoolClosings-Final. pdf
VEXS]; Ben Jorvarsky, The Chicago Manual of School Closings: A Look at How Chicago Officials
Shutter Public Schools, CHI. READER (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/how[https://perma.cc/4L3V-GRMA]; Mary
officials-close-public-schools-cps/Content?oid=8556450
Wisniewski, Chicago School Closings: CPS CEO Proposes 5-Year Moratorium on Closings Post
2013, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/26/chicagoschool-closings_n_2193277.html [https://perma.cc/XPY7-CXY3]. On March 6, 2013, the Chicago
Commission on School Utilization issued its final recommendations to CPS officials. The report
suggests that the district can "safely" close eighty schools in the fall of 2013 (that is, guarantee
that students can be safely transferred to higher-performing schools). See Final Report, CHI.
COMM'N ON SCH. UTILIZATION 1, 1 (Mar. 6, 2013), https://docs.google.com/a/schoolutilization,com/
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NCLB regime, school closures and restarts were by far the least popular
method of addressing failing schools, and the option of taking measures
other than those specified in the law was the most popular. 146
When viewed as a measuring stick for the possibility of
reforming failing public schools, the optics of NCLB's failure are bad.
Arguably, public officials at all levels of government have drawn the
following lesson from the NCLB debacle: public school reform is
ultimately a Sisyphean task. The burden is too heavy and the hill too
steep. As a result, a case can be made that public school "reform
exhaustion" has set in, an exhaustion which is deeply unfavorable to
traditional public schools. While public schools have been by-and-large
freed from the burden and embarrassment of failing to meet NCLB's
adequate yearly progress requirement, the persistent struggles of
public schools are (to varying degrees) now being addressed from
outside, rather than inside, the public school sector-both by an
infusion of competition, and, in some jurisdictions, by the ultimate
accountability device: rather than attempting to fix public schools,
public education officials are opting to close and convert them to charter
schools. 147
Enlisting a CMO to operate failing schools is attractive to public
officials as a means of addressing a dysfunctional institutional culture.
When a school is closed and converted to a charter school, the leadership
and teaching staff are generally dismissed and offered the opportunity
to reapply-but to the charter operator, rather than the school district.
viewer? a =v&pid=sites&srcid=c2Nob29sdXRpbG16YXRpb24uY29tfG Nvb Wl pc3N pb24tb24 tc2N ob
29sLXVOa WxpemFOa W9ufGd40jRiNzFjMWEyNGixZWUOY m U [https://perma.cc/LBU3-U3JL].
146. Eileen M. O'Brien & Charles J. Dervarics, Which Way Up? What Research Says About
School Turnaround Strategies, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. 1, 8 (May 2013, 2012), http://www
.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Policies/Which-Way-Up-At-a-glance/Which-Way-UpFull-Report. pdf [https://perma.cc/8A97-EKV6].
14 7. State Legislation: Accountability-Sanctions I Interventions, EDUC. COMMISSION STATES
(May
23,
2016),
http://www.ecs.org/ecs/ecscat.nsf/WebTopicView?OpenView&count=l&RestrictToCategory=Accountability--Sanctions/Interventions) [https://perma.cc/L4NX-K87D]
(compiling state laws that give states the ability to close failing schools and turn them over to
charter organizations); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1008.33(4)(b)(l)-(5) (2012), (allowing a school
district to either take over the school, "[r]eassign students to another school," close and reopen the
school as a charter school, contract with a private management company, or any other model "that
[has] a demonstrated record of effectiveness"); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § l.85(e)(l)-(4) (2012)
("Each school restructuring plan shall indicate that the district is undertaking one or more of the
following actions in the affected school ... reopening the school as a public charter school .... ");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69, § lJ(o) (2012) (listing sixteen possible actions that a superintendent may
take with respect to a persistently low performing school); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1280c(2) (2011)
("[T]he redesign plan shall require implementation of [one] of the [four] school intervention models
that are provided for the lowest achieving schools under the federal incentive grant program ...
known as the 'race to the top' grant program."); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-105.37B(a) (2012) (stating
that "the State Board of Education may authorize [a] local board of education to adopt" the
transformation, restart, turnaround, or closure model).
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Charter school teachers are rarely unionized, and even where they are,
charter schools are generally not bound by the requirements of
collective bargaining agreements between the local teachers' union and
the public school district. This phenomenon has manifested itself most
dramatically in New Orleans, where almost all traditional public
schools have been closed or converted to charter schools, 148 but charter
conversions are being used as an accountability device in many urban
districts. 149 For example, Robert Bobb, the state-appointed emergency
manager of the Detroit Public Schools, announced plans in 2011 to
convert forty-one of the district's 142 public schools into charter
schools. 150 In New York City, former Mayor Michael Bloomberg boasted
at the end of his term that he had opened five hundred new schools,
including nearly 150 new charter schools, many of which are small
schools "co-located" in buildings that once housed now-defunct
traditional public schools. Bloomberg had also promised to convert large
traditional public schools into at least one hundred new small schools,
including charter schools. 151 However, his successor, Bill DeBlasio,
sought to reverse this policy and instead demand (ultimately
unsuccessfully) that charter schools pay market rents for space in
closed public schools. 152 And former Washington, D.C. school
148. John White, A Fresh Turn in the New Orleans Charter School Miracle, WALL ST. J. (May
27, 2016), http://www. wsj .com/articles/a-fresh-turn-in-the-new-orleans-charter-school-miracle1464387732 [https://perma.cc/LXD6-3DYC].
149. Smarick, supra note 16, at 21; de la Torre & Gwynne, supra note 145, at 1 (noting that
between 2001 and 2009, Chicago had closed forty-four schools because of either "poor academic
performance or underutilization").
150. DPS Presents Renaissance Plan 2012 to Radically Restructure Academically-Failing
Schools, Significantly Reduce Operating Costs Under Model to Seek Charter Proposals for 41
Schools, DETROIT PUB. SCHS. COMMUNITY DISTRICT (Mar. 12, 2011), http://detroitk12.org/content/
2011103/12/dps-presents-renaissance-plan-2012-to-radically-restructu re-academically-failingschools-significantly-reduce-operating-costs-under-model-to-seek-char ter-proposals-for-41schools/ [https://perma.cc/Q7CU-RUEG].
151. Mary Frost, Bloomberg Promises More Charter Schools, Pushes Teacher Evaluation Plan,
BROOKLYN EAGLE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.brooklyneagle.com/articles/bloomberg-promisesmore-charter-schools-pushes-teacher-evaluation-plan [https://perma.cc/824N-A5NN]; see also
Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of New York, 2013 State of the City Address (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.mikebloomberg.com/index.cfm?objectid=D46D1B83-C29C -7CA2-FEF9341031963FE9
[https://perma.cc/ZNQ5-MHDE]:
We've opened 576 new schools over the past 11 years, and we're on track to have added
100,000 new classroom seats by the end of this year. 149 of those new schools have been
charters and yet there are still more than 50,000 children who are still on charter school
waiting lists. Those children and their parents have waited long enough. This
September, we'll open 26 new charters and we'll work to approve many more for 2014.
Some of them will be located within existing public school buildings even though there
are special interests who want to prohibit that from happening.
152. See, e.g., Gerard Robinson, An Uncivil Civil War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 14,
2015, 4:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinionlknowledge-bank/2015/10/14/new-york -citysuncivil-war-over-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/5HYW-RBCPJ; Whitmire, supra note 12.
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superintendent, Michelle Rhee, sparked a maelstrom of controversy
when she engaged charter operators to run several of her district's most
troubled schools.153
There are hints in both state and federal education policy that
this charter "conversion" trend may accelerate in the next few years.
Several states have created state "turn around" or "achievement" school
districts, which have as their primary goal the assumption of control of
failing public schools and their conversion to charter schools. 154
Furthermore, increasing numbers of urban districts are opting to close
under-enrolled and underperforming schools. As I have previously
written, academic performance is only one of the factors fueling the rise
in public school closures (and their conversion to charter schools), but it
is a powerful and persistent one. 155 And, even when school officials
choose not to close schools because of underperformance, academically
struggling schools are almost always selected for closure over successful
ones when enrollment or financial considerations necessitate closures.
For example, in the fall of 2012, the Chicago Public Schools announced
that school closure decisions would henceforth be based upon
enrollment, not academic performance. 156 However, on March 6, 2013,
the Chicago Commission on School Utilization issued final
recommendations about which under-enrolled schools the struggling
district should close. One of two criteria driving the recommendations
was a guarantee that displaced students could be transferred to a
higher-performing school. 157 Finally, proposals for "parent-trigger"

153. See RICHARD WHITMIRE, THE BEE EATER (2001); Quality Schools: Every Child, Every
School, Every Neighborhood, WASH. POST (2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/20102019/W ashingtonPost/2012/01/26/Education/Gra phics/IFF_Final_Report. pdf
[https://perma.cc/
FQ5A-94KB] (recommending further conversions of failing public schools to charter schools,
especially in D.C.'s poorer neighborhoods where quality schools are in short supply). Less
dramatically, in Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel has asked charter operators to consider engaging
school turnarounds rather than opening new schools. Becky Vevea, Public School Closures to be
Based on Enrollment, Not Performance, WBEZ NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.wbez.org/news/
public-school-closures-be-based-enrollment-not-performance-103583
[https://perma.cc/SP6J6JE7]. According to the California Charter School Association, there were 139 conversion charter
schools in California as of 2011. Conversion Charter Schools: A Closer Look, CAL. CHARTER SCHS.
ASS'N (Apr. 2012), http://www.ccsa.org/2012/04/conversion-charter-schools-a-closer·look.html
[https://perma.cc/N8F9-48M2].
154. See Daarel Burnette, Chris Barbie, Founding Superintendent of State-Run Achievement
School District, to Exit, CHALKBEATTENN. (July 17, 2015), http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/tn/2015/
07/1 7/chris-barbic-founding-superintendent-of-achievement-school-district-to-exit/#.VD PDZMrJZ 1 [https://perma.cc/6UPH-VHGS] (describing Barbie's plan to have charter operators
take over twenty-two public schools in Memphis).
155. Garnett, supra note 43, at 301-08.
156. Vevea, supra note 153.
157. See Final Report, supra note 145, at 6 (discussing preliminary recommendations,
including "don't close any ... high performing schools").
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laws, which give parents the option of intervening in the management
of their children's public schools (including demanding their conversion
to charter schools), are gaining momentum. As of 2012, seven states had
passed a "parent trigger" law, six of which give parents the option of
converting their children's schools to a charter school. 158 The provisions
received the unanimous endorsement of the bipartisan U.S. Conference
of Mayors in June 2012. Former Los Angeles Mayor (and Conference of
Mayors Chairman) Antonio Villaraigosa said of the decision, "Parent
Trigger empowers parents to turn failing schools into high-achieving
schools." 15 9 At the federal level, while neither NCLB nor the Race to the
Top program directly triggered many school closures, 160 President
Obama and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan provided financial
support for charter conversions and encouraged them through the
waiver process. At least twenty of the forty-five successful applications
for NCLB waivers included some meaningful mention of either turning
failing public schools over to outside management or restarting them as
charter schools.1 61 While the waivers were eliminated by the ESSA, the
new law increases funding for charter schools and authorizes (but does
not require) states to use these funds to convert failing public schools to

158. Parent Trigger Laws in the States, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/state-parent-trigger-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/QAP6TXV9].
159. Josh Eidelson, "Parent Trigger''.· The Latest Tactic for Fighting Teachers' Unions, SALON
(June 30, 2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/06/30/parent_trigger_the_latest_tactic_for_fighting
_teachers_unions/ [https://perma.cc/2BGD-XSLZ]; see also Memorandum from Tom Cochran, CEO
and Exec. Dir. of U.S. Conf. of Mayors, to Member Mayors (May 29, 2012),
http://www.usmayors.org/80thAnnualMeeting/media/proposedresolutions2012.pdf [https://perma
.cc/YT58-JSE4] (supporting the creation of parent trigger mechanisms).
160. Jennifer McMurrer & Shelby Mcintosh, State Implementation and Perceptions of Title I
School Improvement Grants Under the Recovery Act: One Year Later, CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y 1, 2
(Mar.
2012),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED532794.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29YE-PZ9K]
(describing a study of forty-six states, forty-five of which had a school using the transformation
model); James Taylor et al., State and Local Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act:
Volume IX-Accountability Under NCLB: Final Report, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. 149 (Jan. 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/nclb-accountability/nclb-accountability-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DUT-DVA2]; Patricia Troppe et al., State, District and School Implementation
of Reforms Promoted Under the Recovery Act: 2009-10 through 2011-12, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. xxviii,
103, 113 (Sept. 2015), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20154016/pdf/20154016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZSX9-HDAS].
161. Melissa Lazarin, Charting New Territory: Tapping Charter Schools to Turn Around the
Nation's Dropout Factories, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 1 (June 2011), http://www
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011106/pdf/charter_schools. pdf [https://perma
.cc/7GC2-FKXX] ("The president and U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan have set their
sights on turning around the nation's 5,000 lowest-performing schools, and they are hoping charter
school operators will help shoulder part of the effort."); see also James Cersonsky, A Lesson for
Ame Duncan, NATION (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/lesson-arne-duncan/
[https://perma.cc/AV9D-5NJC].
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charter schools. 162 How states respond to the increased freedom to
structure education policies provided by the ESSA likely will be a
determinative factor in the pace of any future transition to sector
agnosticism.

II. THE COMING TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION LAW
The rise of sector-agnostic education policies has profound
implications not only for the delivery of K12 education in the United
States, but also for the constitutional law of education at both the state
and federal levels. This Section discusses perhaps the most significant
implication of sector agnosticism for education law-the blurring of the
public-private distinction between charter schools and private schools
participating in private school choice programs. As a number of courts
have already held, the case can be made that charter schools are, at
least in some states, legally private schools, not public ones. Three
major shifts in education law flow from this conclusion, each of which
is discussed in turn below. First, if charter schools are publicly funded
private schools rather than privately operated public schools, then the
federal constitutional case for prohibiting authentically religious
charter schools evaporates. Second, if charter schools are private
schools for federal-law purposes-that is to say, if they are not "state
actors"-then the federal constitutional protections governing public
schools do not apply to them. Third, if charter schools are private
schools for state-law purposes, then state constitutional restrictions on
the public funding of private schools may apply to charter schools as
well.

A. The Religious Charter School Question
The first legal implication in the rise of sector agnosticism is the
possibility, as a matter of federal constitutional law, of the erosion of
the assumption that all charter schools must be secular schools. This
assumption may be incorrect for two related reasons: First, it is not
clear whether charter schools should be considered, for federal
constitutional purposes, public or private schools. Second, contrary to
conventional wisdom, a case can be made that public funds flow to
charter schools only indirectly, as the result of numerous parents'

162. See Gina Mahony et al., Charter Schools and the Every Student Succeeds Act, NAT'LASS'N
PUB. CHARTER SCH. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01N3NAPCS-ESSA-Charter-Overview-Webinar-Ol.07 .15-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYW3-8EAU].
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private choices, rather than directly, as the result of a state's decision
to charter a school.
The charter school sector is characterized by a remarkable
degree of institutional diversity. While the high-performing "noexcuses" charter schools, which emphasize traditional academics, high
student expectations, and strict discipline, serving disadvantaged
urban students are probably the best-known, 163 many charter schools
depart dramatically from this back-to-basics model. Some charter
schools focus on a particular curricular theme-for example, STEM,
Afrocentrism, international studies, fine arts, or classical education.
Some charter schools do not exist in the formal, "bricks-and-mortar"
sense at all. As of 2012, there were 228 "virtual" charter schools in
twenty-six states. There also are a growing number of single-sex charter
schools: for example, Urban Prep Academies operate three all-male
college preparatory high schools serving disadvantaged, primarily
African-American students in in Chicago, 16 4 and the Young Women's
Leadership Network is comprised of all-girls public charter schools in
six states, which also serve disadvantaged urban students. 165
There is, however, one hard-and-fast limit on charter schools'
institutional diversity-they must be secular schools. State laws
express this prohibition in various ways. The majority approach is to
simply require that charter schools be "nonsectarian." Seven states (and
the federal government) additionally prohibit charter schools from
being "affiliated" with religious institutions, and two others (Maine and
New Hampshire) prohibit such affiliation to the extent that it is
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. Others (for example, New York)
prohibit charter schools from being "under the control" of a religious
institution. Still others (for example, Georgia) explicitly permit religious
institutions to operate charter schools, so long as the charter schools
that they operate are secular schools. Some states laws are silent on the
question, although the accepted view is that the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause prohibits religious charter schools. 166

163. See Alexander Boyd, Robert Maranto, & Caleb Rose, The Softer Side of "No Excuses,"
EDUC. NEXT (2014), http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_XN_l_maranto.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KZW8-BPP7]; Michael Q. McShane & Jen Hatfield, Measuring Diversity in Charter School
Offerings, AM. ENTER. INST. 1, 3 (July 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07
/Measuring-Diversity-in-Charter-School-Offerings.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQS5-6W6N].
164. About Urban Prep, URBAN PREP ACAD. (2012), http://www.urbanprep.org/about
[https://perma.cc/5XHT-WUL3].
165. Who We Are, YOUNG WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP NETWORK (2016), http://www.ywln.org/whowe-are [https://perma.cc/TPE4-CTAL].
166. See Note, Church, Choice, and Charters: A New Wrinkle for Public Education, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1750, 1765 (2009).
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There are debates about the extent to which charter schools can
incorporate themes with religious connotations, such as cultural or
moral education, into their programs. "Character-based" or "moralsbased" curricular themes pervade the world of charter schools,
although, to be sure, some schools' character-education curricula fall
closer to the "religion" line than others. For example, in Daugherty v.
Vanguard Charter School Academy, a federal court rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a "morals-based" curriculum, which
stressed the classical Greek virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude,
and justice and taught students that "mercy," "compassion," "kindness,"
"forgiveness," "grace," "moral strength," "conscience," "faith," and "selfsacrifice." were associated with these virtues. The court reasoned that
"[t]he fact that the curriculum employs words and concepts in service of
character development that happen to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions, does not necessarily betoken
endorsement" of religion.167
Some charter schools also are structured around cultural themes
with strong religious overtones. For example, the now-defunct Tarek
Ibn Ziyad Academy ("TiZA") in Minnesota was named for the Muslim
general who conquered Spain, and the school was founded and directed
by an imam. The school required a course in Arabic language, scheduled
vacations around Muslim holidays, permitted "voluntary and studentled prayer," and promised to "help students integrate into American
society, while retaining their identity" as Middle Easterners. Following
a settlement between the ACLU and the state of Minnesota, TiZA was
forced to close. 168 The Hebrew-themed Ben Gamla Charter School in
Hollywood, Florida, is named for a historical figure who established
Jewish schools throughout ancient Israel, was founded by a rabbi, and
167. Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897, 913 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
The school at issue in the case, the Vanguard Charter Academy, is one of over eighty charter
schools operated by the National Heritage Academies, each of which employs the curriculum
challenged in the case. Collectively, in 2014-2015, the National Heritage Academies educated
more than fifty-one thousand children. At a Glance, NAT'L HERITAGE ACADS., http://www
.nhaschools.com/About-Us/Pages/At-a-Glance.aspx
(last
visited
Sept.
20,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/DA78-J2V7]; Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L HERITAGE ACADS., http://www
.nhaschools.com/About-Us/Pages/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/2VHE-9NK5].
168. Katherine Kersten, a writer with the Center of the American Experiment, wrote
extensively about the school for several years, leading to a state investigation of the school and
instigating the ACLU lawsuit. Teacher Questions Muslim Practices at Charter School, STAR TRIB.
(May 19, 2008), http://www.startribune.com/aclu-settles-with-state-school-sponsor/115533274/
[https://perma.cc/5SMX-35FK]; see also Sarah Lemagie, ACLU Settles with School, Sponsor, STAR
TRIB.
(Feb.
7,
2008),
http://www.startribune.com/aclu-settles-with-state-school-sponsor/
115533274/ [https://perma.cc/T7FW-CKNU]; Sarah Lemagie, State Orders Charter School to
Correct Two Areas Tied to Islam, STAR TRIB. (May 20, 2008), http://pluralism.org/news/stateorders-charter-school-to-correct-2-areas-tied-to-islam/ [https://perma.cc/3VAE-XQLV].
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initially was directed by a former Jewish day school director. The school
serves only kosher food and requires that one period each day be
dedicated to teaching Hebrew and that a second period to be taught in
a mix of English and Hebrew. 169 Due to ACLU threats oflitigation, the
school was forced to "scrub" its curricula of religious references three
times and-at one point-required to freeze Hebrew instruction. 170
Since then, the school, which seems to have resolved its differences with
the local school board and placated the ACLU, has come to be
considered a model for Hebrew charter schools across the United
States. 171 In 2015, the nation's first charter school focusing on Chaldean
culture-a minority Christian sect in Iraq and Syria-opened in
suburban Detroit. The school will require all students to become fluent
in modern Aramaic, the language spoken by Chaldean Christians, and
will offer a course on Mesopotamian history. 172
Since charter funding comes at the cost of secularizing the
curriculum, similar disputes arise when private religious schools
"convert" to charter schools. The conversion of religious schools to
charter schools is not uncommon. 173 For example, in 2001, NBA
superstar David Robinson founded a private Christian school for
disadvantaged students in San Antonio, the George W. Carver
Academy. In 2012, Robinson decided to enlist a secular charter
provider, IDEA Public Schools, to operate the school as a charter school
in order secure access to public funds. 174 Catholic bishops in a number
of dioceses, including Brooklyn, Washington, D.C., Miami, and
Indianapolis, have opted-usually with encouragement oflocal political

169. Abby Goodnough, Hebrew Charter School Spurs Dispute in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/24/education/24charter.html?pagewanted=print&_r=l
2007),
[https://perma.cc/J37K-WE5P].
170. School Can Resume Lessons in Hebrew, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /09/12/us/12charter .html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/BQ76-F839].
171. Elissa Gootman, State Weighs Approval of School Dedicated to Hebrew, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/nyregion/12hebrew:html?_r=l&pagewanted=l&ref
=education [https://perma.cc/S2D5-4TEJ].
172. Lori Higgins, New Charter School Boosts Chaldean, Assyrian Cultures, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Aug. 19, 2015, 9:38 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/oakland/2015/
08/19/chaldean-charter-school-opens-madison-heights/3123 7333/ [https://perma.cc/8TBE-D58Y].
173. Twelve states expressly forbid the conversion of private schools to charter schools,
although, in practice, conversions can be structured so as to easily avoid offending such statutes.
Charter Schools, NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N (2015), http://www.nea.org/home/16332.htm [https://perma.cc/
XQ3J-DZ9Q].
174. Maria Luisa Cesar, Carver Going the Charter Route, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Feb.
28 2012, 11:32 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/education/article/Carver-going-charterroute-3368119.php [https://perma.cc/XAP6-CTRD].
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leaders-to convert struggling urban Catholic schools to secular charter
schools rather than closing them. 17 5
1. The "Publicness" of Charter Schools

There are two related reasons why it is broadly assumed that
charter schools cannot be religious schools. The first is the universal
assumption that charter schools are public schools, not private schools.
The second is the assumption that public schools flow directly to charter
schools as a result of the government's decision to open a school, rather
than indirectly as the result of parents' enrollment decisions. While the
Supreme Court Establishment Clause canon is riddled with confusion
and inconsistencies, the Court's opinions make abundantly clear that
public schools must be secular. 176 That is to say, that public schools may
not teach religion as the truth of the matter. Charter schools are
considered public schools for two overlapping reasons. The first reason
is that charter school proponents and operators generally benefit from
that categorization and routinely refer to the "publicness" of charter
schools. As Aaron Saiger has observed, "Uninterrogated claims that
charter schools are public schools are routine if not ubiquitous .... The
publicness of the charter school has become central to the selfunderstanding of many funders, advocates, legislators, politicians,
unions, scholars and ordinary folk involved in or supportive of the
charter movement." 177 For example, the largest association of charter
schools in the United States is the "National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools." 178
The second reason that charter schools are considered public is
that state laws universally characterize charter schools as public
schools. Indeed, most state statutes call them "public charter schools."
The logic of this characterization flows from the fact that, at least
theoretically, charter school laws do more than permit charter schools
to operate. They enable the creation of charter schools through the
authorization process. Theoretically, charter schools do not exist before
they are granted a "charter" by a government-authorized charter-school
175. See BRINIG & GARNETT, supra note 27, at 45-56.
176. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating prayer before public school
graduation); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana law mandating the
teaching of "creation science" in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 4 72 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating
moment of silence statute); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(invalidating bible reading and school prayer as violation of the Establishment Clause).
177. Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn in
Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163, 1179-80 (2013).
178. NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4DCC-8EHQ].
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authorizer (most frequently state boards of education and local school
boards, and, in some states, special public commissions, universities,
and not-for-profit entities). 179 But, the "creation" of a new school
through a chartering process does not necessarily make it "public" for
Establishment Clause purposes. After all, private schools generally
cannot operate without government approval. Moreover, most private
schools-including those participating in private school choice
programs-are private corporations, also created by a state's decision to
grant a "charter."
Even if the "creation" of a school by government act made it a
public entity for Establishment Clause purposes, the reality on the
ground in most states is that charter schools are not being "created"
when they are granted a charter. The charter market has evolved away
from early expectations that the chartering process would create new
schools. More and more charter schools are franchises or branches of a
CMO. The CMO, in seeking a charter, is seeking permission to expand
to a new market (or within an existing one). The CMO, not the state,
creates the school, which is privately operated largely independently
from the public educational authorities. In fact, with the expansion of
CMO-managed schools, private schools participating in parental choice
programs may be more likely to be "created" by state law (through the
incorporation process) than charter schools. Moreover, in some states,
private as well as public entities can be charter authorizers. For
example, several states authorize nongovernmental entities-including
private universities and nonprofit organizations-to authorize the
creation of charter schools, subject to ratification by the state's
department of education. During the 2009-2010 school year, 109 out of
Minnesota's 149 charter schools were authorized by private entities,
including twenty-six authorized by religious institutions. Currently in
Ohio, private, not-for-profit corporations authorize more than forty
percent of the state's charter schools, including the St. Aloysius
Orphanage, which alone authorizes forty-four schools. 180 Put
differently, in some states, many charter schools are not authorized by
the government at all, but by private (including religious) entities.

179. See Overview of the State of Charter Authorizing, NAT'L Ass'N CHARTER SCH.
AUTHORIZERS (2014), http://www.qualitycharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NACSA_2014SOCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/46KY-AJUF].
180. See Membership, OHIO ASS'N CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, http://www.oacsa.org/
pages/membership.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/G2KD-MWXW]; St. Aloysius
Sponsorship, Call for New Community Schools to Open in FY2018, CHARTER SCH. SPECIALISTS
(Sept.
9,
2016),
http://www.charterschoolspec.com/data/CSS-Call-for-New-Schools-FinalSeptember-9-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XVS· WSWF].
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2. The Erosion of the Direct-Indirect Aid Distinction

The second reason that it is commonly assumed that the
Establishment Clause prohibits religious charter schools is what is
known as the "direct-indirect" funding distinction in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As the Court observed in
Zelman, "[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between
government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and
programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches
religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices
of private individuals." 181 In the indirect aid context, the Court has held
that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit religious institutions
from receiving public funds, since the relevant decisionmaker is the
private recipient of the funds (or, in the case of school-aged children,
the recipients' parents), not the government. In Zelman, for example,
the Court reasoned that private religious schools were but one among a
wide range of educational options available to Cleveland school children
and the program was one of "true private choice." This remained the
case even though ninety-six percent of the children participating in the
program chose to attend religious schools.182
In contrast, the Court has held that the government may not
directly fund religious activities or instruction. As a result, the Court
has limited direct government assistance to secular aspects of a
religious organization's activities. This rule extends through a long line
of cases addressing the constitutionality of programs providing secular
aid to religious institutions-for example, transportation for religiousschool students, 183 secular textbooks, 184 educational materials including
computers, 185 tutors for secular remedial instruction, 186 and capital
expenditures for the construction of secular buildings at religious
colleges. 187 In large part because the Court has assumed that most
religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools, especially
Catholic ones, are "pervasively sectarian"-that is, that religion
pervades all aspects of instruction-direct financial assistance to
181. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
182. Id. at 639.
183. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
184. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
185. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion). Mitchell u. Helms overruled
two previous cases suggesting that the Establishment Clause prohibited direct aid-in both cases,
instructional materials-that might be adapted for religious purposes. See Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
186. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1997)).
187. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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"sectarian" elementary and secondary schools has long been considered
a constitutional taboo. 188 The prevailing wisdom is that the funding of
charter schools is direct aid, made by virtue of the government's
decision to authorize a charter school to operate, unlike the funding of
pFivate school choice, which is indirect.189
The Court has been divided about what constitutes a program of
"private choice." For example, in Mitchell v. Helms, the Court
considered an Establishment Clause challenge to the use of federal
funds to purchase instructional equipment for religious schools. 190 The
Court had previously rejected nearly identical expenditures, in large
part because it characterized them as providing "direct" rather than
"indirect" aid to religious schools.1 91 In approving the expenditures at
issue in Mitchell, a plurality of the Court characterized the program at
issue as one of private choice since private schools benefited only
because parents enrolled eligible children in them. 192 Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justice Breyer, rejected this characterization, however,
expressing discomfort with the plurality's "approval of actual diversion
of government aid to religious indoctrination." 193
The plurality's characterization of "indirect aid" in Mitchell
might command a majority in a future case. Until that time, however,
the Establishment Clause question in the charter school context turns
on whether funds flow directly to the schools as a result of the
government's decision to authorize it to operate or indirectly as a result
of parents' decisions to enroll their children in it. The prevailing
assumption that charter schools are an example of "direct" funding,
however, is arguably incorrect since charter schools receive funding on

188. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 621-22 (1988) (observing that the Court has held
"parochial schools" to be "pervasively sectarian"); Meek, 421 U.S. at 363 ("[I]t would simply ignore
reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions from the predominantly religious role
performed by many of Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary schools .... ");
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 636-37 (1971) ("A school which operates to commingle religion
with other instruction plainly cannot completely secularize its instruction. Parochial schools, in
large measure, do not accept the assumption that secular subjects should be unrelated to religious
teaching.").
189. Tellingly, a year after the Archdiocese of Indianapolis announced its decision to convert
two inner-city Catholic schools into charter schools, Indiana adopted a private school choice
program. Two years later, the Archdiocese decided to "reconvert" the charter schools into Catholic
schools, which would participate in the state's voucher program as authentically religious schools.
See Steve Hinnefeld, Indy's Catholic-to-Charter School Experiment Comes to an End, SCH.
MATIERS: K-12 EDUC. IN IND. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://inschoolmatters.wordpress.com/2014/08/27/
indys-catholic-to-charter-school-experiment-comes-to-an-end/ [https://perma.cc/G3Y9-4B78].
190. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
191. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977); Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-63.
192. Mitchell, 503 U.S. at 816-17.
193. Id. at 837.
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a per-pupil basis as a result of a parent's enrollment decision. Consider
New Orleans, where parents of modest means have two choices for their
children: enroll them in a charter school, a decision which results in the
state of Louisiana directing per-pupil allocation of funds to the charter
school according to a formula based upon the amount of state and local
funding that a public school would receive to educate that child, 19 4 or
enroll them in a private school, which results in the State of Louisiana
directing a public "scholarship" to the private school based upon a
similar formula. 195 Arguably, the per-pupil allocation of charter school
funds and the "scholarship" provided by the Louisiana Scholarship
Program is a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the charter school
funds and the scholarship funds initially were drawn from the same
state funding source, which is known as the Minimum Foundation
Program. 196

***
All of this said, the fact that religious charter schools may be
constitutionally permissible does not itself mean that they are legally
permitted. State law requirements that charter schools be "secular" are
ubiquitous, and the political impediments to removing statutory
prohibitions on religious charter schools substantial. 19 7 As a result,
litigation asserting that prohibitions on religious charter schools
themselves violate the First Amendment may be the only short-term
strategy for eliminating statutory mandates that charter schools be
"secular." The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses prohibit the government
from either favoring or disfavoring religious individuals or
institutions, 198 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has relied upon this rule to invalidate the exclusion of religious

194. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3971-4001 (2016); Stephen Sugarman, Is It Unconstitutional to
Prevent Faith Based Schools from Becoming Charter Schools? (July 6, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
195. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:4011-25 (2016).
196. In 2013, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled on grounds unrelated to religion that the
funds distributed from the Minimum Foundation Program could not go to private schools. See La.
Fed'n of Teachers v. State, 118 So. 3d 1033 (La. 2013).
197. To begin, such a legislative move would invite costly and controversial litigation with an
uncertain outcome. Moreover, the political opposition to lifting the ban on religious charter schools
would presumably be at least as fierce as opposition to private school choice (perhaps more so
because there is more money at stake) and the political support tepid, since religious organizations
might well, for a host of reasons (including anxiety about a loss of autonomy), prefer that states
enact private school choice laws.
198. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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schools from a public scholarship program. 199 On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has twice rejected the claim that
the exclusion of religious high schools from a statewide private school
choice program violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause. Both cases involved a unique "tuitioning" program in Maine,
which provided public funds to enable children residing in school
districts without public high schools to attend private, but not religious,
schools. The first, Strout v. Albanese, reasoned that permitting parents
to use public funds to send their children to religious schools would
violate the Establishment Clause, a result foreclosed three years later
in Zelman. 200 The second, Eulitt v. Maine Department of Education, was
decided after Zelman, but reasoned that the State of Maine could,
without running afoul of the Equal Protection or Free Exercise Clauses,
opt not to provide funding for religious education even if such funding
would be constitutionally permissible. 201 The Eulitt court relied heavily
on the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v. Davey, which upheld a
Washington program that provided college scholarships but prohibited
the recipient from pursing a devotional theology degree. 202 In Davey, the
State of Washington asserted that this exclusion was required by the
state constitution's Blaine Amendment, which was more restrictive
than the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that compliance
with the state constitution was a substantial interest and the burden
on the plaintiffs exercise of religion minimal.2° 3 Since the majority
opinion emphasized the unique "antiestablishment interests" at stake
when state funds are used to support members of the clergy, Locke does
not foreclose a challenge to state laws prohibiting religious charter
schools, but it certainly complicates such a claim. The Supreme Court's
forthcoming decision in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley, which asks
whether a $tate may exclude a religious school from a public subsidy
program because it is religious, promises to shed further light on the
question. 204
199. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
200. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting federal constitutional
challenge to the exclusion of religious schools from Maine's "tuitioning" program); see also Bagley
v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999) (rejecting similar challenge on state constitutional
grounds).
201. 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004).
202. Id. at 354-55.
203. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724-25 (2004).
204. See Eugene Volokh, The Supreme Court Will Consider: When Does Government
Discrimination Against Churches Violate the First Amendment?, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01115/the-su preme-court-willconsider-when-does-government-discrimination-against-churches-violate-the-first-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/ 42AC-QARQ].
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B. Charter Schools and the State Action Doctrine
The implications of categorizing charter schools for federal
constitutional purposes as "private" schools extend beyond the realm of
the Establishment Clause. The legal implications of the conclusion that
charter schools may not be "public" are enormous, since it would mean
that millions of students are now attending-and thousands of teachers
employed by-schools where they are not afforded constitutional rights.
These include the constitutional norms that govern the relationships
between traditional public schools and their teachers and students,
such as the First Amendment's protection of free expression, 205 the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures, 206 and the Due Process Clause's substantive and procedural
protections when students and teachers are disciplined or suspended. 207
The question of whether the charter schools are state actors for these
purposes has received some limited scholarly attention. For example,
Aaron Saiger argues that charter schools are "private" for
Establishment Clause purposes, but otherwise should be considered
state actors. 208 Gillian Metzger asserts that "charter schools most likely
would be found part of the government for constitutional purposes,
given that they are officially denominated public schools, often are
created by the state, and operate subject to the state's direct
oversight." 209 Robert O'Neil wrote in 1999 that charter schools were an
"easy case" of state action, given the states' close regulation of their
operations. However, O'Neil suggested, without predicting, that the
more laissez faire regulatory approach assumed by most states since he
wrote would alter his analysis. 210 More recently, Preston Green, Bruce
205. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
student suspension for displaying a sign that said "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to high school's decision
to exclude controversial articles from student newspaper); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that student suspension for wearing a black arm band to protest the
Vietnam War violated First Amendment).
206. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that strip search
of teenage student violated Fourth Amendment); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 92 v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822 (2002) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to school policy of suspicionless drug
testing of student athletes); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that search of
student purse did not violate Fourth Amendment).
207. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that Due Process Clause required hearing
before student suspended for more than ten days).
208. Saiger, supra note 177, at 1181.
209. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1495-96
(2003).
210. Robert M. O'Neil, School Choice and State Action, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 215, 220 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer
eds., 1999).
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Baker, and Joseph Oluwole have argued that charter schools are
problematic precisely because they cannot properly be characterized as
state actors. 211 And a handful of student notes have addressed the issue,
reaching various conclusions, including the suggestion that the current
state action doctrine is ill-equipped to deal with the public-private
hybrids like charter schools.212
The Supreme Court has articulated a number of factors to
determine whether an institution should be considered a state actor for
federal constitutional purposes 213-that is to say when there is a
"sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action"
to attribute the action to the government. 214 These factors include
whether the private party is performing a "governmental" function; 21 5
whether the government compelled or significantly encouraged the
challenged action; 216 whether the government controls the private actor
to such an extent that the private actor is appropriately characterized
as a governmental agent; 217 and the degree of interdependence between
the government and the private actor. 218 The cases make clear that
neither government regulation nor government funding necessarily
transforms a private entity into a public one. For example, in RendallBaker v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court held that a heavily regulated private
school for special-needs students that received more than ninety
percent of its funds from the state was not a state actor. 219 "The school,"

211. Preston C. Green et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to Obtain
Funding of the Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 EMORY L.J. 303 (2013); see
also Preston C. Green et al., Charter Schools, Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine: Are
the Rights of Students of Color Sufficiently Protected?, 18 WASH. & LEE J. Crv. RTS. & Soc. JUST.
253 (2012).
212. Justin M. Goldstein, Note, Exploring "Unchartered" Territory: An Analysis of Charter
Schools and the Applicability of the U.S. Constitution, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 133 (1998); Maren
Hulden, Note, Charting a Course to State Action: Charter Schools and§ 1983, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1244 (2011); Catherine LoTempio, Comment, It's Time to Try Something New: Why Old Precedent
Does Not Suit Charter Schools in the Search for State Actor Status, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 435
(2012); Jason Lance Wren, Note, Charter Schools: Public or Private? An Application of the
Fourteenth Amendment's State Action Doctrine to These Innovative Schools, 19 REV. LITIG. 135
(2000).
213. See Metzger, supra note 209, at 1495-96 (listing factors).
214. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
215. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 (1988).
216. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("[A] State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the State.").
217. See id.
218. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 299-301
(2001).
219. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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the Court observed, "is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends on [government] contracts. Acts
of such private contractors do not become acts of the government by
reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing
public contracts." 220 And, importantly for the purposes of analyzing the
status of charter schools, the Supreme Court has ruled that entities
created by government action (e.g., the United States Olympic
Committee) are not necessarily state actors. 221 It has also held that the
legal characterization of an entity as "private" is not dispositive of the
state action determination. Presumably, the opposite is also true: if a
law designating an entity as "private" does not control the state action
question, then presumably a law designating an entity as "public"
should not either.222
The development of the state action doctrine has-to be surenot been linear, although it has tended to proceed toward a more
formalistic analysis of the extent that the private entity in question is
either controlled by or controls governmental actors or, as most recently
articulated, is "entwined" with them. 223 As a result, the application of
the state action doctrine to charter schools may vary from state to state,
along with the extent of state control over charter school operations. 224
For example, despite substantial prodding by the federal
government, 225 a number of states continue to limit the number of
charter schools. The details of these caps vary dramatically-some
states cap the number of new charters per year, others limit the total
number of charter schools in the state (with the caps ranging from fortytwo to 850 schools). Still others limit charter schools' geographic
220. Id. at 840-41; see also Jackson v Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that
government regulation of a utility that possessed a state-granted monopoly did not make the
utility a state actor); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that state grant
of a liquor license to a private club was not sufficient entanglement to make the club a state actor).
221. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm'n, 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987).
222. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (holding that Amtrak was a
governmental entity, regardless of its congressional designation as private).
223. See Metzger, supra note 209, at 1413; see also Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. 288 (holding
that nonprofit entity organized to regulate high school athletics in Tennessee was a state actor
because of its substantial "entwinement" with public schools).
224. Despite substantial prodding by the federal government, a number of states continue to
cap the number of charter schools. The details of these caps vary dramatically-some states cap
the number of new charters per year, others limit the total number of charter schools in the state
(with the caps ranging from forty-two to 850 schools), still others limit charter schools' geographic
location. See Education Opportunity Index, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, http://parentpowerindex
.edreform.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K84H-AX2P].
225. For example, the U.S. Department of Education has sought to condition access to certain
federal education funds on states eliminating charter school caps. See Press Release: States Open
to Charters Start Fast in 'Race to Top,' U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (June 8, 2009),
http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/06/06082009a. html [https://perma.cc/E 7ZH -W5W6].
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locations. 226 The extent to which charter schools are exempt from
regulations governing traditional public schools, such as mandatory
curriculum requirements, also varies by state. And some states have
been more aggressive about closing charter schools for academic
underperformance than others. 227 Even in states with substantial
government regulation, however, the line between public and private
can be blurred. Like charter schools, all states regulate private schools
to some extent, for example, by requiring standardized testing,
minimum instructional hours, and curricular content. Many also place
conditions on the "approval" to operate, usually in the form of private
accreditation. States with private school choice programs often place
additional regulatory requirements on participating schools, including
excluding persistently underperforming schools from parental choice
programs. 228 And, as the discussion above illustrates, the Supreme
Court has made clear that neither comprehensive regulation (including
licensing) nor public funding has the effect of transforming a private
entity into a public one.
Federal courts have divided over the question of whether (and
when) charter schools should be treated as state actors. In Caviness u.
Horizon Community Learning Center, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit answered that question in the negative. 229 The case arose
after an Arizona charter school teacher was dismissed following a
complaint by a female student. The teacher sued, alleging that his
dismissal violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the charter school
was not a state actor. 230 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the
teacher's assertion that Arizona law's designation of charter schools as
"public schools" that provide "public education service" controlled the
question. 2 3 1 It also rejected the claim that the school was a state actor
because it was performing a traditional state function (public

226. See Julie D. Bell, Charter School Caps, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES 1 (Dec. 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/CharterSchoolCaps. pdf
[https://perma.cc/LRZ7-7JZV];
Charter School Laws Across the States: 2015 Rankings and Scorecard, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM 2
(2015),
https://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/CharterLaws2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KG N7-GQ8Y].
227. See 50-State Comparison: Charter School Policies, EDUC. COMM'N STATES (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.ecs.org/html/offsite.asp?document=educationlssues/CharterSchools/CHDB_intro.asp.
[https://perma.cc/8GPJ-MT4J].
228. See The ABCs of School Choice, supra note 81 (collecting and summarizing regulations).
229. 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that charter school was not a state actor and
therefore rejecting teacher's § 1983 due process claim).
230. See id. at 810-12.
231. Id. at 812-14.
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education). 232 The court reasoned that, whatever the legal designation
of the charter school (which was, under state law, also a private
corporation), the state action determination turned on whether a
sufficiently close "nexus" between the state and the challenged action
existed such that the school's action could fairly be said to be the action
of the state. 233 The court rejected the argument that this nexus was
established when Arizona initially reviewed and approved the school's
charter, which included the school's self-created personnel policies.
Instead, citing Rendall-Baker, the court concluded the termination
decision was in no way related to the actions of the state but was the
purely private action of a private corporation following privately
created termination procedures. 234 Relying on Caviness, a federal
district court similarly dismissed a teacher's First Amendment claim
against a charter school in Sufi v. Leadership High School. 235 The judge
reasoned that, although the charter school's dismissal of a teacher
(allegedly for speaking out about the unfair distribution of health
benefits) was enabled in some way by the state law authorizing the
creation of charter schools, the connection between the decision to
authorize the school and the school's dismissal decision was too
attenuated to be fairly classified as "state action." 236
In other decisions, federal courts have taken a more formalistic
approach, holding that charter schools are state actors because they are
designated as public schools by state law and/or because public
education is a traditional function of state governments. For example,
in Nampa Classical Academy v. Goesling, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a charter school could not sue the state of Idaho for violating the
First Amendment by imposing certain curricular requirements because
Idaho law established that charter schools were political subdivisions
of the state. 237 Federal district courts in Illinois, Ohio, and New York
similarly have relied upon the state law designations of charter schools
as "public schools" to conclude that they are state actors subject to
§ 1983 liability. 238 In Riester v. Riverside Community School, for
example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
232. See id. at 814-16.
233. Id. at 812.
234. See id. at 815-18.
235. No. C-13-01598 (EDL), 2013 WL 3339441, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2013).
236. See id. at *6-9.
237. 447 F. App'x 776, 778 (9th Cir. 2011).
238. See Jordan v. N. Kane Educ. Corp., No. 08 C 4477, 2009 WL 509744, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
2, 2009) (holding that dismissed teacher could sue charter school for alleged due process violation);
Matwijko v. Bd. of Trs. of Glob. Concepts Charter Sch., No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 WL 2466868, at *l
(W.D.N.Y Aug. 24, 2006) (recommending that dismissed teacher be allowed to sue a charter school
for alleged First Amendment violation).
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Ohio held that Ohio law's designation of charter and community schools
as public "ends the inquiry" into the state action question. 239 At least
one district court relied on the fact that charter schools perform a
traditional state function (public education) in holding that they are
state actors-despite the obvious circularity in concluding that the
education provided by charter schools is "public" education. 240
While the legal implications of the conclusion that charter
schools may not be state actors are enormous, the practical implications
of the state action question may be less dramatic, for a number of
related reasons. First, legislatures and administrative agencies (both
state and federal) retain the ability to regulate most aspects of charter
school operations, even if they are not state actors. 241 All states, in fact,
regulate both private and charter schools to varying degrees. Second,
under both state and federal law, charter schools may be government
actors for some purposes (e.g., their relationships with their students)
and private actors for others (e.g., their contractual relationships with
their employees). 242 Third, a finding that charter schools are not public
would not necessarily foreclose liability for misconduct. On the
contrary, state courts are divided on whether charter schools are
sufficiently "governmental" to enjoy the protection of state statutes
immunizing government actors from tort liability. 243 In these cases, the
plaintiffs-students, teachers, and parents-argue that charter schools
are private in order to circumvent government immunity. Given the
trend in federal constitutional law toward greater deference to public
school actors, state tort law may ultimately provide a more effective
mechanism for policing charter school malfeasance than the federal
constitution. Finally, unlike in traditional public schools, charter school
parents have greater recourse to police charter schools through the
exercise of what Alfred Hirschman famously termed "exit, voice, and
239. 257 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (2002).
240. See Scaggs v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., No. 06-CV-0799 (JFB) (VVP), 2007 WL 1456221,
at *13-14 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (holding that the charter school was a state actor because public
education was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state).
241. For example, regulations promulgated pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act mandate that charter schools serve disabled students unless state law has assigned
that responsibility to another entity. 34 C.F.R. § 300.209 (2006).
242. See Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2010)
(''It is important to identify the function at issue because an entity may be a State actor for some
purposes, but not for others." (quoting Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 555 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002))); Cornish
v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that in a suit by terminated
employee of private prison contractor, the question is "whether [defendant] acted under color of
state law in terminating [plaintiffs] employment, not whether its providing juvenile corrections
services was state action").
243. See Preston C. Green, III et al., The Legal Status of Charter Schools in State Statutory
Law, 10 UMASS. L. REV. 240, 240-76 (2015).
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loyalty."244 That is to say that parents are empowered to withdraw their
children and place them in another school if their demands for change
are unsatisfied. This kind of choice-and the parental autonomy and
authority that it enables-is at the heart of sector-agnostic education
policy.

C. Charter Schools and State Constitutions
If, for purposes of federal law, characterizing charter schools as
"private" actors has the effect of immunizing them from constitutional
scrutiny, for purposes of state law, such a characterization may have
the opposite effect. This is because, in contrast to the federal
constitution, most state constitutions have a variety of provisions that
directly address both public and private education. These provisions fall
into two categories: The first category includes the Blaine Amendments
and other provisions that place explicit limitations on the public
funding of private schools. The second category addresses the
establishment, structure, and funding of public schools. Constitutional
provisions falling into both categories have been held to restrict private
school choice programs in several states. For example, as discussed
above, the Arizona and Colorado Supreme Courts have invalidated
voucher programs on Blaine Amendment grounds. 245 In 2006, the
Florida Supreme Court surprised many by holding that a statewide
"failing schools" voucher law ran afoul of a provision falling in the
second category, which mandated the establishment of a "uniform,
efficient, safe, secure and high quality system of public schools.''2 46 The
justices reasoned that the use of public funds to send children to private
schools undermined the "uniformity" of the Florida public schools
system. More recently, in 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in
Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State that the state constitution
prohibited funds reserved for public schools, known as the "Minimum
Foundation Program," from being used for private school choice. 247 Not
surprisingly, given the developments in the charter school market
described above, opponents have begun to file lawsuits alleging that
charter schools violate both types of provisions because they are
effectively private schools. This Section discusses the possibility that

244. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-44 (1970).
245. See Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 2009); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas
Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461, 471 (Colo. 2015).
246. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006).
247. 118 So. 3d 1033, 1051 (La. 2013).
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state constitutional provisions limiting the funding of private schools
may also limit the funding of charter schools.
1. Charter Schools and Public-Funding Restrictions

In September 2014, nearly a year after hearing oral arguments,
the Washington Supreme Court became the first state supreme court to
invalidate a charter school law on the grounds that charter schools were
insufficiently public to receive public education funds. 248 The case,
League of Women Voters v. State of Washington, resolved a challenge to
a law enacted by referendum in 2012 that empowered two
governmental agencies-a new state charter school commission and the
Washington State Board of Education-to authorize the creation of
charter schools in the state. The law designated charter schools a.s
"common schools" and required them to comply with certain baseline
academic and curricular expectations (and required the authorizing
agencies to monitor their performance), but also guaranteed them
substantial autonomy and relieved them of oversight by local school
boards. 249 The law further directed that charter schools be funded in the
same manner as traditional public schools. 2 50
The plaintiffs alleged that the charter school law violated Article
IX, § 2 of the Washington Constitution, which requires the.
establishment of "a general and uniform system of public schools,"2 5 1
including "common schools" (among others). That provision further
provides that "the entire revenue derived from the common school fund
and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the
support of the common schools."252 The majority in League of Women
Voters concluded that charter schools were not common schools, since
the court had previously held-in a 1909 opinion called School Dist. No.

248. See League of Women Voters v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1137-40 (Wash. 2015) (explaining
that charter schools do not qualify as "common schools," and thus the "Charter School Act's
provisions authorizing diversion of ... restricted funds are unconstitutional").
249. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 28A. 710.005(1)(g) (West 2016) (stating that that the charter
school statutes "free teachers and principals from burdensome regulations that limit other public
schools," thereby giving charter schools "the flexibility to innovate" regarding staffing and
curriculum), invalidated by League of Women Voters, 355 P.3d 1131; WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
28A.710.040(3) (West 2016):
For the purpose of allowing flexibility to innovate in areas such as scheduling,
personnel, funding, and educational programs to improve student outcomes and
academic achievement, charter schools are not subject to, and are exempt from, all other
state statutes and rules applicable to school districts and school district boards of
directors.
250. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 28A.710.220, 230(1) (West 2016).
251. WASH. CONST. art. IX,§ 2.
252. Id.
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20 v. Bryan 253-that common schools must be controlled by local school
boards. Therefore, the court reasoned, the law, which directed that
charter schools be funded in the same manner as other public schools,
was unconstitutional. 254 The court rejected the argument that charter
schools could be financed from the general fund, reasoning that all
revenue raised for the purpose of education were common school funds
and that the funding provisions were not severable from the
substantive provisions of the charter school law since the law did not
segregate the funding of common schools and other educational
options. 255
The dissenting justices agreed with the conclusion that charter
schools were not common schools but disagreed with the conclusion that
the funding provisions in the law rendered them unconstitutional. On
the contrary, the dissent argued that, although the statute directed that
funding for charter schools parallels funding for traditional public
schools, the source of the funds was the state's general fund, not the
"common school fund" (constitutional term of art). In fact, the dissent
pointed out that, taken to its logical extreme, the majority's opinion
would prohibit any educational expenditures except for common
schools, when, in fact, millions of dollars are allocated for educationrelated expenditures other than the common schools each year. The
dissenting justices further argued that any constitutionally flawed
provisions of the law dealing with funding were severable from the
provisions establishing charter schools. 256
The Washington decision closely parallels the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Federation of Teachers,
discussed previously, which invalidated the use of certain funds to
finance the state's voucher program. 257 As discussed below, the
Louisiana Association of Educators has also challenged the use of this
fund for certain kinds of charter schools-specifically those not
authorized and regulated by local school boards-arguing, in essence,
that charter schools should be treated, for state constitutional purposes,

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

51 Wash. 498, 502 (Wash. 1909).

See League of Women Voters, 355 P.3d at 1137-40.
Id. at 1140--41.
Id. at 1141-48 (Fairhurst, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Danielle Dreilinger, Louisiana Supreme Court Rules Voucher Funding Violates the
State Constitution, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 7, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2013/05/breaking_louisiana_supreme_cou.html
[https://perma.cc/6CNE-6JAR].
Scholarships are now funded from other sources of state funds. See Julia O'Donoghue, Over $3.37
Million for Louisiana's School Voucher Program Goes Unused, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 25, 2014,
11: 59 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index. ssf/2014/11/louisiana_private_voucher_prog.html
[https://perma.cc/U8JP-GPLU].
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as private schools, not public ones. 258 Both decisions leave open the
possibility that alternate sources of public funds may be
constitutionally directed to the funding of private and charter schools.
Indeed, following Louisiana Federation of Teachers, the state did find
another way to fund the voucher program. However, in wa·shington, as
the dissent highlights, the constitutional path to legally funding charter
schools is a narrow one at best, requiring the careful segregation of
public education funds for use by traditional public schools only. 2 59
Neither League of Women Voters nor Louisiana Federation of
Teachers turned on the interpretation of the state Blaine Amendment.
They could not, by definition, have done so, because Louisiana does not
have a Blaine Amendment and Washington's Blaine Amendment only
prohibits public funding of religious schools by providing that "[a]ll
schools maintained wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever
free of sectarian control." 260 Nevertheless, the Washington case
arguably has opened the door to future challenges to charter schools
that rely on a range of state constitutional restrictions of public
expenditures in the education context, including on Blaine
Amendments that encompass both private and secular schools.
A number of such lawsuits have been filed, thus far
unsuccessfully. For example, in Council of Organizations & Others for
Education About Parochaid, Inc. v. Engler, 261 the plaintiffs alleged that
Michigan's fledgling charter school law, enacted in 1993, ran afoul of
the state's sweeping prohibition on the funding of private schools,
known as the "Parochaid" Amendment, which provides:
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized,
by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or
indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, preelementary, elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption
or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall
be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the
employment of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution
where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. 262

258. Sharon Brooks Hodge, Lawsuit Threatens Public Funding for Charter Schools in
Louisiana, LA. RECORD (Mar. 27, 2016), http:/llouisianarecord.com/stories/510703957-lawsuitthreatens-public-funding-for-charter-schools-in-louisiana [https://perma.cc/G5S8-7KKP]; Danielle
Dreilinger, Teachers Union Sues Louisiana to Defund Some Charter Schools, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Sept. 24, 2014, 1:04 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/09/teachers_union_sue s
_louisiana.html [https://perma.cc/4YS2-4DSU].
259. See League of Women Voters, 355 P.3d at 1146 (Fairhurst, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
260. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
261. 566 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich. 1997).
262. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
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The trial court and court of appeals agreed with the plaintiffs.
The courts reasoned that, because charter schools could be authorized
by both community colleges and public universities, the statute
authorized the funding of schools that were not under the control of the
state. 263 A divided Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. The justices
emphasized that the lawsuit presented a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute and that the court must therefore satisfy
itself that the statute was unconstitutional in all of its applications.
Given the comprehensive regulation of charter schools, which Michigan
law describes as "public school academies," the fact that all the
authorizing bodies in the state were public entities, and the duty to
defer afforded to the legislature in defining the term "public schools,"
the court concluded that charter schools should not be considered
"private" schools subject to the Parochaid amendment. Rather, the
justices concluded that the state had simply enabled the establishment
of a new kind of public schools, albeit ones that happened to be privately
operated. 264 The dissent in the Engler decision arguably presaged
debates about the public versus private nature of charter schools that
are currently playing out in state-action cases in federal courts. In his
spirited dissent, Justice Boyle argued that the level of public control
over charter schools was insufficient to support a conclusion that they
were public rather than private schools. He concluded, "[T]he
Legislature . . . cannot make what is private, public, simply by
declaring it so."265
While it is certainly the case that a school might be "private" for
federal constitutional purposes and "public" for state constitutional
purposes (or vice versa), the market and regulatory developments that
further erode the legal and factual bases for concluding that charter
schools are state actors also reopen the question posed by Justice Boyle:
Should state constitutions prohibit the funding of charter schools to the
same extent that they prohibit private school choice? In most states, the
question is moot. Some Blaine Amendments only prohibit the funding
of "sectarian" schools, and-thus far-charter schools must be secular.
(Others limit the funding of all private schools.) Moreover, a majority of
state supreme courts to have considered this issue have concluded that
their Blaine provisions do not preclude private school choice because
they incorporate the distinction between the "direct" and "indirect"
funding of religious schools embraced in the U.S. Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause decisions. In states that have rejected (or might
263. Council of Organizations, 566 N.W.2d at 212-13.
264. Id. at 213-22.
265. Id. at 223-25 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
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reject) this direct-indirect funding dichotomy, decisions concluding that
charter schools are private schools presumably would limit charter
school funding to the same extent that they limit private school funding.
2. Charter Schools and "Uniformity" Requirements
At least since the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Holmes, 266 litigation challenging private school choice programs
routinely features claims that the funding, even indirectly, of private
schools is inconsistent with state constitutional provisions requiring the
maintenance of public schools. 267 Virtually all state constitutions
contain such a provision, generally called "uniformity" provisions,
although the contours of the mandate vary significantly across
jurisdictions, with the text of state education guarantees spanning a
range from open ended and general to quite specific. 268 Generally, state
constitutions require the. establishment of a system of public schools,
with provisions using a range of adjectives to describe the required
system
(e.g.,
"uniform,"
"efficient,"
"suitable,"
"adequate,"
"thorough"). 269 Florida's constitution is perhaps the most elaborate,
demanding that "[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education."270 Thus
far, these "uniformity" challenges to private school choice have not been
met with success outside of Florida.
Charter school opponents nevertheless have begun to mimic the
tactic in litigation arguing that charter schools also run afoul of
uniformity provisions. These suits allege that charter schools are
unconstitutional because they undermine the quality and uniformity of
public school systems. For example, in State ex rel Ohio Congress of
Parents & Teachers v. State Board of Education, a closely divided Ohio
Supreme Court rejected a uniformity challenge to the state law
establishing and authorizing "community schools" (as charter schools
are called in Ohio). 271 The plaintiffs alleged that charter schools
unconstitutionally inhibited the state's ability to provide for a thorough
and efficient system of public schools by diverting funding away from

266. 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
267. See Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States' Duty to Support "Public" Schools, 48
B.C. L. REV. 909, 924-44 (2007).
268. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 87, at 958-62.
269. See Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUC. LAW CTR.
(2011), http://pabarcrc.org/pdf/Molly%20H unter%20Article. pdf [https://perma.cc/U3N5-8 7PQ].
270. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § l(a).
271. 857 N.E.2d 1148, 1166 (Ohio 2006).
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traditional public schools. They further argued that the state law
prov1s10ns freeing charter schools from many of the education
regulations governing traditional public schools violated the state
constitutional provision mandating a "thorough and efficient" system of
public schools. 272 In rejecting these claims, the majority concluded that
charter schools were a constitutionally appropriate means of reforming
public education and increasing educational options in Ohio, which
were subject to many of the same baseline regulations guaranteeing
school quality as traditional public schools. 273 The majority further
concluded that nothing in the Ohio constitution prohibits the reduction
in funding of traditional public schools when students exit for other
options. 274 The dissenting justices argued, as would the majority in the
Washington charter school decision, that charter schools not only
undermine the public education system but-because they were
privately operated and freed from local board control-could not be
considered common schools entitled to public funds. 2 75
In other cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that charter school
laws run afoul of state uniformity clauses because they divest local
school boards of control over public education. These claims are
conceptually distinct from the issue presented in cases like League of
Women Voters u. Washington and Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers,
in which the plaintiffs alleged that charter schools are unconstitutional
because they are effectively publicly funded private schools. In the
second version of uniformity claims, the plaintiffs allege that charter
schools must be supervised in a particular way (i.e., by local school
boards) because they are public schools. In 2011, the Georgia Supreme
Court endorsed this claim in Gwinnett County School District u. Cox.
The court invalidated the state statute establishing the Georgia
Charter School Commission as inconsistent with a state constitutional
provision vesting control of public schools in local boards of education. 276
(The state subsequently amended its constitution to allow for the
authorization of charter schools by bodies other than local school
districts. 277)

272. Id. at 1154.
273. Id. at 1157-59.
274. Id. at 1160.
275. Id. at 1166--71 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
276. See Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 710 S.E. 2d 773, 775 (Ga. 2011).
277. See Motoko Rich, Georgia's Voters Will Decide on Future of Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/education/future-of-georgias-charter-schoolson-ballot.html [https://perma.cc/3MAL-ZLDZ]; Motoko Rich, Charter Schools Win Support in
Georgia Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/georgiaapproves-charter-school-measure-washington-state-still-counting.html?_r=O
[https://perma.cc/
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Other courts have rejected these claims, reasoning that the
legislature has significant latitude to experiment with restructuring the
mechanisms for delivering K12 education. 27 8 For example, in 2002, the
Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim similar to that which would later
be endorsed by the Georgia Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in the case
alleged that the state's charter school act was unconstitutional because
it vested the authorization and supervision of charter schools with the
Utah State Board of Education, rather than local school boards. 279 The
Utah Supreme Court concluded that the Utah Constitution gave the
legislature plenary power to structure the state's educational system to
advance the goals of an educated populace, including by establishing
nontraditional public schools like charter schools. 280
As with the Blaine Amendment challenges to charter school
statutes discussed previously, litigants seeking to use uniformity.
provisions to challenge charter schools face substantial hurdles. With
the exception of Bush v. Holmes, successful uniformity challenges have
targeted disparities within the public school system, not alternatives to
it. More than half of all state courts have relied on these provisions to
invalidate the state funding mechanisms for traditional public school,
with courts holding that overreliance on local property taxes to fund
public schools results in unconstitutional disparities in resources and
educational opportunities between rich and poor districts. Efforts by.
proponents of parental choice to argue that the logic of the "funding
equity" suits to demand an expansion of educational options, including
lawsuits seeking public funding portability as a remedy for these
unconstitutional disparities, have failed. More recently, charter school
proponents have begun to argue that the pervasive funding disparities
between traditional public schools and charter schools run afoul of state
uniformity challenges. Again, these lawsuits have-thus far-been
unsuccessful.

43CJ-NUJS]; see also Regina Umpstead et al., Charter Schools and the Law: Current Issues in
U.S. Courts and Legislatures, 298 EDUC. L. REP. 657, 672 (2014).
278. See Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("[O]ur
constitution vests the Legislature with sweeping and comprehensive powers in relation to our
public schools .... ");Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. RE-2 v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 217 P.3d 918, 930
(Colo. App. 2009) (explaining that Colorado's Charter Schools Act was constitutional because
"[u]nder existing case law, the State may apportion the state-controlled Public School Fund in any
manner that is not unreasonable"); State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of
Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148, 1159 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the Ohio legislature did not exceed its
powers in setting standards and requirements for common school systems).
279. See Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 17 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Utah 2001).
280. Id. at 1128-31.
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CONCLUSION: EDUCATION LAW IN A SECTOR-AGNOSTIC FUTURE

In both the federal and state context, the legal implications of
sector agnosticism depend on empirical realities that currently vary by
state, such as the extent of parental choice (in both the private and
charter school sectors) and the level of control exercised by regulators
over these choices. They also depend on the confluence of a number of
political, legal, and market forces any one of which may impede or
accelerate the further transition to sector agnosticism. The more that
charter schools and private school choice converge, the more the courts
will be asked to resolve the legal questions flagged above. That
convergence is already occurring in many American cities, where
charter schools look more and more like a private school choice device,
and increasing numbers of students are spending public funds to attend
"true" private schools.
Whether this convergence will continue or even accelerate is
difficult to predict. For example, while the new federal education
statute permits states to use federal funds to convert failing public
schools into charter schools and encourages the elimination of several
barriers to further charter expansion, federal law no longer (contra the
waiver policy) directly incentivizes these actions. 281 Moreover, while the
footprint of private school choice continues to expand, most state's
programs are small and funded at levels far below traditional public
schools and charter schools (which themselves receive far less funding
than their district counterparts). Moreover, any further transition to
sector agnosticism (and future evolution of education law resulting from
that transition) likely depends on a host of other factors, including the
ability of the charter and private school sectors to continue to secure
legislative victories in the face of political opposition growing more
determined by the day to halt the expansion of the parental choice
footprint; to live up to the promise of delivering educational excellence
outside of the traditional public school sector; and to recruit and attract
sufficient talent and resources to replicate, build, and staff excellent
schools serving disadvantaged children. The answer to these questions,
which are by-and-large beyond the scope of this Article, will determine
the shape of education policy and education law for decades to come.

281. See Charter Schools One Step Closer to Big Win with Senate Passage of ESSA, NAT'L
ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/press/charter-

schools-step-closer-big-win-senate-passage-essa/ [https://perma.cc/GBE4-KKAQ].

